smos-bin

maintainer NickSpurry · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP archive from docs.smos.online (not the canonical upstream smos.cs-syd.eu domain) and installs its contents directly as executables. There is no signature verification, only a SHA-256 checksum. The host docs.smos.online appears to be a documentation/asset subdomain rather than an official release host, and the commented-out previous checksum suggests the archive has been silently replaced at least once without a pkgver bump. Installing arbitrary prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical host with only a checksum (no GPG signature) is a genuine supply-chain risk: if the host is compromised or the maintainer of that host acts maliciously, users receive and execute untrusted code. This fits the medium severity definition exactly.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:9 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://docs.smos.online/assets/smos-release.zip")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP archive from docs.smos.online (not the canonical upstream smos.cs-syd.eu domain) and installs its contents directly as executables. There is no signature verification, only a SHA-256 checksum. The host docs.smos.online appears to be a documentation/asset subdomain rather than an official release host, and the commented-out previous checksum suggests the archive has been silently replaced at least once without a pkgver bump. Installing arbitrary prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical host with only a checksum (no GPG signature) is a genuine supply-chain risk: if the host is compromised or the maintainer of that host acts maliciously, users receive and execute untrusted code. This fits the medium severity definition exactly.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Nick Spurry <nick at spurry family .net>
2pkgname=smos-bin
3pkgver=0.10.0
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="The tool that manages your stress and workload"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://smos.cs-syd.eu/"
8license=('MIT')
9source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://docs.smos.online/assets/smos-release.zip")
10#sha256sums=('f1cd3136aef464c7e16d9b1bbd9aa65e799e9d6d64d7a234e51ed313c5b9ac2d')
11sha256sums=('82bb258ba1c8d99b97c861a478bd221e2390929bc333291d712a2af7b6d79cf7')
12provides=('smos')
13package() {
14 mkdir $pkgdir/usr
15 cp -r $srcdir/bin $pkgdir/usr
16 cp -r $srcdir/share $pkgdir/usr
17 chmod -R 755 $pkgdir/usr
18}
19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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