snip

maintainer Connor · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (pkg.tar.xz containing an executable at usr/bin/snip) from software.concise.cc, which is a personal/project-specific host rather than official distribution infrastructure (e.g., GitLab releases). The maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), suggesting self-hosting, but this is still an unofficial binary host. A PGP key is listed in validpgpkeys, which would provide meaningful verification if makepkg actually validates the signature — however, no .sig source file is listed alongside the tarball, so PGP validation will not actually occur. The sha512sum provides integrity but not authenticity. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin, making this a real supply-chain concern: if software.concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host without effective signature verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (pkg.tar.xz containing an executable at usr/bin/snip) from software.concise.cc, which is a personal/project-specific host rather than official distribution infrastructure (e.g., GitLab releases). The maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), suggesting self-hosting, but this is still an unofficial binary host. A PGP key is listed in validpgpkeys, which would provide meaningful verification if makepkg actually validates the signature — however, no .sig source file is listed alongside the tarball, so PGP validation will not actually occur. The sha512sum provides integrity but not authenticity. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin, making this a real supply-chain concern: if software.concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host without effective signature verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
2# ---
3pkgname=snip
4pkgver=1.2.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A simple snippet manager for your predefined Ultisnips Snippet Directory"
7arch=(any)
8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
9license=('MIT')
10depends=(neovim)
11source=(
12 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
13)
14sha512sums=(
15 '97db421c99b0fd707444d784a97f757d6d70ea3a5862ad0b77aa27d7bb9d2325b1c643ca3b8473a08b5eb8107f10fe53d81922b0b1f1e721510d3c0ee0d20955'
16)
17md5sums=(
18 '5fb143d40d9dcd624374ebd7ba5ea615'
19)
20validpgpkeys=(
21 '81BACEEBC3EA26E127166E4A819BB92A9A48160E'
22)
23
24package() {
25
26 cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-${arch}" ||
27 cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}"
28
29 [ -d ${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/nvim/plugged ] && _vimDir=${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/nvim/plugged || _vimDir=$HOME/.vim/plugged;
30
31 install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
32 install -Dm755 usr/bin/${pkgname} "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
33 install -Dm755 usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md"
34 install -Dm755 usr/share/man/man1/${pkgname}.1.gz "${pkgdir}usr/share/man/man1/${pkgname}.1.gz"
35 install -Dm755 usr/share/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim"
36 install -Dm644 usr/share/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim "${pkgdir}${_vimDir}/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim"
37
38}
39

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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