snip

MEDIUM

maintainer Connor 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (pkg.tar.xz containing an executable at usr/bin/snip) from software.concise.cc, which is a personal/project-specific host rather than official distribution infrastructure (e.g., GitLab releases). The maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), suggesting self-hosting, but this is still an unofficial binary host. A PGP key is listed in validpgpkeys, which would provide meaningful verification if makepkg actually validates the signature — however, no .sig source file is listed alongside the tarball, so PGP validation will not actually occur. The sha512sum provides integrity but not authenticity. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin, making this a real supply-chain concern: if software.concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host without effective signature verification.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (pkg.tar.xz containing an executable at usr/bin/snip) from software.concise.cc, which is a personal/project-specific host rather than official distribution infrastructure (e.g., GitLab releases). The maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), suggesting self-hosting, but this is still an unofficial binary host. A PGP key is listed in validpgpkeys, which would provide meaningful verification if makepkg actually validates the signature — however, no .sig source file is listed alongside the tarball, so PGP validation will not actually occur. The sha512sum provides integrity but not authenticity. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin, making this a real supply-chain concern: if software.concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host without effective signature verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
    
      2# ---
    
      3pkgname=snip
    
      4pkgver=1.2.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="A simple snippet manager for your predefined Ultisnips Snippet Directory"
    
      7arch=(any)
    
      8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
    
      9license=('MIT')
    
      10depends=(neovim)
    
      11source=(
    
      12  "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
    
      13)
    
      14sha512sums=(
    
      15  '97db421c99b0fd707444d784a97f757d6d70ea3a5862ad0b77aa27d7bb9d2325b1c643ca3b8473a08b5eb8107f10fe53d81922b0b1f1e721510d3c0ee0d20955'
    
      16)
    
      17md5sums=(
    
      18  '5fb143d40d9dcd624374ebd7ba5ea615'
    
      19)
    
      20validpgpkeys=(
    
      21  '81BACEEBC3EA26E127166E4A819BB92A9A48160E'
    
      22)
    
      23
    
      24package() {
    
      25
    
      26  cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-${arch}" ||
    
      27  cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}"
    
      28
    
      29  [ -d ${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/nvim/plugged ] && _vimDir=${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/nvim/plugged || _vimDir=$HOME/.vim/plugged;
    
      30
    
      31  install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      32  install -Dm755 usr/bin/${pkgname} "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      33  install -Dm755 usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md"
    
      34  install -Dm755 usr/share/man/man1/${pkgname}.1.gz "${pkgdir}usr/share/man/man1/${pkgname}.1.gz"
    
      35  install -Dm755 usr/share/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim"
    
      36  install -Dm644 usr/share/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim "${pkgdir}${_vimDir}/${pkgname}/plugin/${pkgname}.vim"
    
      37
    
      38}
    
      39

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2