socketwrench

MEDIUM

maintainer pioh 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from asleepysamurai.com, which is a personal/project website rather than an established official release infrastructure (like GitHub releases, a distro mirror, or a well-known vendor CDN). The binary is an Electron-based application ('Socket Wrench') that gets extracted and installed directly to /opt and /usr/bin. While there is a sha256sum check providing some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, the trust anchor is entirely the personal host asleepysamurai.com — if that host is compromised or the binary is swapped (with a matching hash update), users would execute arbitrary code. This is a classic AUR supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source executable from a non-auditable personal host. The sha256sum mitigates opportunistic MITM but not a deliberate host-side substitution. Rated medium rather than high because there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or exfiltration — it is a genuine but non-malicious supply-chain risk pattern.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://asleepysamurai.com/articles/socketwrench/binary/SocketWrench-${pkgver}-setup.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from asleepysamurai.com, which is a personal/project website rather than an established official release infrastructure (like GitHub releases, a distro mirror, or a well-known vendor CDN). The binary is an Electron-based application ('Socket Wrench') that gets extracted and installed directly to /opt and /usr/bin. While there is a sha256sum check providing some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, the trust anchor is entirely the personal host asleepysamurai.com — if that host is compromised or the binary is swapped (with a matching hash update), users would execute arbitrary code. This is a classic AUR supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source executable from a non-auditable personal host. The sha256sum mitigates opportunistic MITM but not a deliberate host-side substitution. Rated medium rather than high because there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or exfiltration — it is a genuine but non-malicious supply-chain risk pattern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Artemiy Dudko <thepioh(at)zoho(dot)com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=socketwrench
    
      4pkgver=0.0.1
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Socket Wrench is to Websockets what Postman/Insomnia is to HTTP connections (kinda)."
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://asleepysamurai.com/articles/socketwrench"
    
      9license=('custom')
    
      10# depends=('alsa-lib' 'gtk3' 'libsecret' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'nss' 'xdg-utils')
    
      11# optdepends=('libappindicator-gtk3: Systray indicator support'
    
      12#             'org.freedesktop.secrets: Keyring password store support')
    
      13source=("https://asleepysamurai.com/articles/socketwrench/binary/SocketWrench-${pkgver}-setup.deb")
    
      14noextract=("SocketWrench-${pkgver}-setup.deb")
    
      15sha256sums=('bcd2dd48a953ff649999ff28bc4fb4b62e4f2f248e74c627332607d554c1d19b')
    
      16
    
      17package() {
    
      18    bsdtar -O -xf "SocketWrench-${pkgver}-setup.deb" data.tar.xz | bsdtar -C "${pkgdir}" -xJf -
    
      19
    
      20    # Permission fix
    
      21    find "${pkgdir}" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
    
      22    
    
      23    mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      24    ln -s "../../opt/Socket Wrench/socketwrench" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/socketwrench"
    
      25    # # Move license
    
      26    # install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      27    # mv "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/slack/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      28    # ln -s "/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/slack/LICENSE"
    
      29}
    
      30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2