sonic-x11-session-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, a personal/project host that is not an official Arch Linux mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against accidental corruption or simple MITM), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host — if that host is compromised or the maintainer swaps the file, users get arbitrary binaries executed on their systems. The URL is not reproducible from upstream source (github.com/Sonic-DE/plasma-workspace-sonic) and there is no way to verify the binary matches what would be built from that source. This is a classic supply-chain risk: prebuilt binary from an unofficial personal host with no independent build attestation. The sha256sum mitigates accidental substitution but not intentional replacement by the host owner. This warrants a MEDIUM rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/sonicde/${_pkgname2}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from x11libre.net, a personal/project host that is not an official Arch Linux mirror or well-known vendor CDN. The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the package directory. While a sha256sum is provided (offering some integrity protection against accidental corruption or simple MITM), the trust anchor is entirely the x11libre.net host — if that host is compromised or the maintainer swaps the file, users get arbitrary binaries executed on their systems. The URL is not reproducible from upstream source (github.com/Sonic-DE/plasma-workspace-sonic) and there is no way to verify the binary matches what would be built from that source. This is a classic supply-chain risk: prebuilt binary from an unofficial personal host with no independent build attestation. The sha256sum mitigates accidental substitution but not intentional replacement by the host owner. This warrants a MEDIUM rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: artist for XLibre <artist4xlibre@proton.me>
_pkgname1=plasma-x11-session
_pkgname2=sonic-x11-session
pkgname="${_pkgname2}-bin"
pkgver=6.6.4
pkgrel=3.1
pkgdesc="KDE Plasma X11 Session, light version with fixes and improvements"
arch=(x86_64)
url='https://github.com/Sonic-DE/plasma-workspace-sonic'
license=('custom')
options=(!strip)
source=("https://x11libre.net/repo/arch_based/x86_64/sonicde/${_pkgname2}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
noextract=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
depends=(accountsservice
appstream-qt
dbus
fontconfig
freetype2
gcc-libs
glibc
icu
kactivitymanagerd
karchive
kauth
kbookmarks
kcmutils
kcolorscheme
kcompletion
kconfig
kconfigwidgets
kcoreaddons
kcrash
kde-cli-tools
kdeclarative
kded
kdbusaddons
kglobalaccel
kguiaddons
kholidays
ki18n
kiconthemes
kidletime
kio
kio-extras
kio-fuse
kirigami
kirigami-addons
kitemmodels
kjobwidgets
knewstuff
knighttime
knotifications
knotifyconfig
kpackage
kparts
kpipewire
krunner
kquickcharts
kscreenlocker
kservice
kstatusnotifieritem
ksvg
ksystemstats
ktexteditor
ktextwidgets
kuserfeedback
kwallet
kwayland
kwidgetsaddons
kwin
kwin-x11-sonic
kwindowsystem
kxmlgui
layer-shell-qt
libcanberra
libice
libkexiv2
libksysguard
libplasma
libqalculate
libsm
libx11
libxau
libxcb
libxcrypt
libxcursor
libxfixes
libxft
libxtst
milou
ocean-sound-theme
plasma-activities
plasma-activities-stats
plasma-workspace-sonic
plasma5support
prison
qt6-5compat
qt6-base
qt6-declarative
qt6-location
qt6-positioning
qt6-svg
qt6-tools # for qdbus
qt6-virtualkeyboard
sh
solid
systemd-libs
wayland
xcb-util
xcb-util-cursor
xcb-util-image
xorg-xmessage
xorg-xrdb
xorg-xwayland
zlib)
provides=($_pkgname1 $_pkgname2 "${_pkgname1}-sonic")
conflicts=($_pkgname1 $_pkgname2 "${_pkgname1}-sonic")
replaces=("${_pkgname1}-sonic")
sha256sums=('643a5b3e2fdef4d31b3deb4e6c1ab438480a504c80c9e62806a28e7cb3522dbe')
package() {
tar -xf "${_pkgname2}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}" usr
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |