soupault

maintainer mcode10 · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary downloaded from files.baturin.org, which is a personal/project host operated by the soupault author (Daniil Baturin). While this is the author's own distribution infrastructure rather than a third-party host, it is not a neutral release platform (e.g., GitHub releases, PyPI, official distro mirrors). A prebuilt binary is executed directly on the user's system with no source build, meaning any compromise of files.baturin.org or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary if the PKGBUILD's hash were also updated. This is a classic supply-chain concern for AUR binary packages from personal hosting — real but not clearly malicious, consistent with MEDIUM severity.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://files.baturin.org/software/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary downloaded from files.baturin.org, which is a personal/project host operated by the soupault author (Daniil Baturin). While this is the author's own distribution infrastructure rather than a third-party host, it is not a neutral release platform (e.g., GitHub releases, PyPI, official distro mirrors). A prebuilt binary is executed directly on the user's system with no source build, meaning any compromise of files.baturin.org or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary if the PKGBUILD's hash were also updated. This is a classic supply-chain concern for AUR binary packages from personal hosting — real but not clearly malicious, consistent with MEDIUM severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: mcode10 <manas at designX6 dot com>
    
      2# Soupault Author: Daniil Baturin <daniil+soupault at baturin dot org>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=soupault
    
      5pkgver=4.8.0
    
      6pkgrel=1
    
      7pkgdesc="A static website management tool."
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9url="https://soupault.app/"
    
      10license=('MIT')
    
      11source=("https://files.baturin.org/software/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")
    
      12sha256sums=('dd8ecc792958d88cb217bdf87825626925ea1b0b893311a0662aa99820697974')
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15	install -D -m755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}/${pkgname}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      16	install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      17	install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}/README.md" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md"
    
      18}
    
      19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2