soupault

MEDIUM
maintainer mcode10 3 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary downloaded from files.baturin.org, which is a personal/project host operated by the soupault author (Daniil Baturin). While this is the author's own distribution infrastructure rather than a third-party host, it is not a neutral release platform (e.g., GitHub releases, PyPI, official distro mirrors). A prebuilt binary is executed directly on the user's system with no source build, meaning any compromise of files.baturin.org or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary if the PKGBUILD's hash were also updated. This is a classic supply-chain concern for AUR binary packages from personal hosting — real but not clearly malicious, consistent with MEDIUM severity.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://files.baturin.org/software/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary downloaded from files.baturin.org, which is a personal/project host operated by the soupault author (Daniil Baturin). While this is the author's own distribution infrastructure rather than a third-party host, it is not a neutral release platform (e.g., GitHub releases, PyPI, official distro mirrors). A prebuilt binary is executed directly on the user's system with no source build, meaning any compromise of files.baturin.org or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary if the PKGBUILD's hash were also updated. This is a classic supply-chain concern for AUR binary packages from personal hosting — real but not clearly malicious, consistent with MEDIUM severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: mcode10 <manas at designX6 dot com>
2# Soupault Author: Daniil Baturin <daniil+soupault at baturin dot org>
3
4pkgname=soupault
5pkgver=4.8.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="A static website management tool."
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://soupault.app/"
10license=('MIT')
11source=("https://files.baturin.org/software/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")
12sha256sums=('dd8ecc792958d88cb217bdf87825626925ea1b0b893311a0662aa99820697974')
13
14package() {
15 install -D -m755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}/${pkgname}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
16 install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
17 install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-linux-${CARCH}/README.md" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md"
18}
19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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