sovet

MEDIUM
maintainer r2bb1t 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary from updates.sovetchat.ru, which is the vendor's own update/distribution server for a Russian corporate chat platform. The AppImage is extracted during prepare() (running the binary with --appimage-extract) and then installed. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual substitution, but the host is a non-GitHub, non-standard distribution endpoint for a relatively obscure Russian SaaS product with no independent verification chain. The core concern is: this is an opaque, prebuilt executable from a single vendor-controlled server with no reproducible build, no code signing verification beyond a single sha256 in the PKGBUILD itself. If the upstream host is compromised or the maintainer updates the hash to match a malicious binary, users get arbitrary code execution. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern — not clearly malicious, but a real risk pattern for an executed binary from an unofficial/personal-project host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source_x86_64=("Soviet_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage::https://updates.sovetchat.ru/downloads/Soviet_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary from updates.sovetchat.ru, which is the vendor's own update/distribution server for a Russian corporate chat platform. The AppImage is extracted during prepare() (running the binary with --appimage-extract) and then installed. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual substitution, but the host is a non-GitHub, non-standard distribution endpoint for a relatively obscure Russian SaaS product with no independent verification chain. The core concern is: this is an opaque, prebuilt executable from a single vendor-controlled server with no reproducible build, no code signing verification beyond a single sha256 in the PKGBUILD itself. If the upstream host is compromised or the maintainer updates the hash to match a malicious binary, users get arbitrary code execution. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern — not clearly malicious, but a real risk pattern for an executed binary from an unofficial/personal-project host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: LurkHub <LurkHub@yandex.ru>
2pkgname=sovet
3pkgver=2.24.0
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Корпоративная платформа для совместной работы: чат, видеоконференции, задачи, файлы. Аналог Microsoft Teams. Сервер в России."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://sovetchat.ru"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('fuse2')
10options=('!strip')
11source_x86_64=("Soviet_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage::https://updates.sovetchat.ru/downloads/Soviet_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage")
12sha256sums_x86_64=('a8bba8928b18ccb3e49ae2bc147b92360c3343f90eb5f3dc0c2015ec388e4956')
13
14prepare() {
15 chmod +x "Soviet_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage"
16 ./"Soviet_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage" --appimage-extract >/dev/null 2>&1
17}
18
19package() {
20 install -dm777 "${pkgdir}/opt/sovet"
21 install -Dm755 "Soviet_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/opt/sovet/sovet.AppImage"
22 chmod 777 "${pkgdir}/opt/sovet/sovet.AppImage"
23
24 # Иконка — в pixmaps и в hicolor (для KDE/GNOME)
25 install -Dm644 squashfs-root/sovietmsg.png \
26 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/sovet.png"
27 install -Dm644 squashfs-root/sovietmsg.png \
28 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/128x128/apps/sovet.png"
29
30 # Ярлык в меню
31 install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/sovet.desktop" << EOF
32[Desktop Entry]
33Name=Совет
34Comment=Корпоративная платформа: чат, видеоконференции, задачи
35Exec=/opt/sovet/sovet.AppImage
36Icon=sovet
37Type=Application
38Categories=Network;Chat;
39StartupNotify=true
40StartupWMClass=sovietmsg
41EOF
42
43 # Обёртка в PATH
44 install -Dm755 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/sovet" << 'EOF'
45#!/bin/bash
46exec /opt/sovet/sovet.AppImage "$@"
47EOF
48}
49

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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