spark-store-console-bin

maintainer mzwing · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from Gitee (gitee.com/spark-store-project/spark-store), which is the official upstream project repository for Spark Store on Gitee — a major Chinese code hosting platform analogous to GitHub. The project is a real, known community app store for Deepin/UOS-based systems. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary blob extracted from a .deb (contents of /opt and /usr copied directly), with no source compilation. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. The concern is that this is an executed binary from a non-GitHub host that cannot be independently verified against a canonical upstream, and the installed files include whatever scripts/binaries are bundled in the .deb. The 'console' variant depends heavily on shell scripts (wget, aria2, curl, sudo, polkit usage suggests privileged operations). This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from an unofficial (non-distro, non-PyPI/npm/etc.) host installed directly, even if the project appears genuine.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source_x86_64=("spark-store-console_$pkgver-console_all.deb::https://gitee.com/spark-store-project/spark-store/releases/download/$pkgver/spark-store-console_$pkgver-console_all.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from Gitee (gitee.com/spark-store-project/spark-store), which is the official upstream project repository for Spark Store on Gitee — a major Chinese code hosting platform analogous to GitHub. The project is a real, known community app store for Deepin/UOS-based systems. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary blob extracted from a .deb (contents of /opt and /usr copied directly), with no source compilation. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. The concern is that this is an executed binary from a non-GitHub host that cannot be independently verified against a canonical upstream, and the installed files include whatever scripts/binaries are bundled in the .deb. The 'console' variant depends heavily on shell scripts (wget, aria2, curl, sudo, polkit usage suggests privileged operations). This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from an unofficial (non-distro, non-PyPI/npm/etc.) host installed directly, even if the project appears genuine.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: mzwing <mzwing@mzwing.eu.org>
2# Co-Maintainer: Misaka13514 <Misaka13514 at gmail dot com>
3
4pkgname=spark-store-console-bin
5pkgver=4.8.1
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='Spark Store, A community powered app store, based on DTK. (Console version)'
8arch=('x86_64')
9url='https://www.spark-app.store/'
10license=('GPL-3.0')
11depends=('wget' 'aria2' 'zenity' 'polkit' 'libnotify' 'python' 'desktop-file-utils' 'curl' 'sudo' 'lsb-release' 'gnupg')
12provides=('spark-store-console')
13source_x86_64=("spark-store-console_$pkgver-console_all.deb::https://gitee.com/spark-store-project/spark-store/releases/download/$pkgver/spark-store-console_$pkgver-console_all.deb")
14sha256sums_x86_64=('d034d46ef246d69c4fa950a54a4e8a91857816edf267bd2817b0ff52911d2360')
15
16prepare() {
17 tar -Jxf data.tar.xz -C "${srcdir}"
18}
19
20package() {
21 cp -dpr --no-preserve=ownership "$srcdir/opt/" "$pkgdir/opt"
22 cp -dpr --no-preserve=ownership "$srcdir/usr/" "$pkgdir/usr"
23}
24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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