splashtop-business

maintainer lauradestrigter · 6 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing a Debian .deb package with compiled executables) directly from download.splashtop.com, which is the official Splashtop vendor download host. This is a legitimate vendor distribution channel, not a personal or unofficial host, so the risk is lower than a random third-party mirror. However, the package still installs prebuilt proprietary binaries that cannot be audited, and there is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum. If the vendor host were compromised or the checksum were to drift, arbitrary code would execute. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary software distributed as prebuilt binaries from a vendor CDN in the AUR: not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the inability to verify the binary's integrity beyond a hash and the lack of source-build reproducibility.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 source=("https://download.splashtop.com/linuxclient/${pkgname}_Ubuntu_v${pkgver}_amd64.tar.gz")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing a Debian .deb package with compiled executables) directly from download.splashtop.com, which is the official Splashtop vendor download host. This is a legitimate vendor distribution channel, not a personal or unofficial host, so the risk is lower than a random third-party mirror. However, the package still installs prebuilt proprietary binaries that cannot be audited, and there is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum. If the vendor host were compromised or the checksum were to drift, arbitrary code would execute. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary software distributed as prebuilt binaries from a vendor CDN in the AUR: not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the inability to verify the binary's integrity beyond a hash and the lack of source-build reproducibility.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Andrew Simmons <agsimmons0 at gmail dot com>
2# Contributor:: Tab Fitts <tfitts [at] spryservers [dot] net>
3
4pkgname=splashtop-business
5pkgver=3.8.0.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Splashtop Business. Remotely access your desktop from any device from anywhere!"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://www.splashtop.com/business"
10license=('LicenseRef-Proprietary')
11depends=('gcc-libs' 'glibc' 'keyutils' 'libcap' 'libpulse' 'libxcb' 'qt5-base' 'util-linux-libs' 'xcb-util-keysyms' 'xcb-util' 'xdotool' 'zlib')
12optdepends=('bash-completion: Bash completion support')
13provides=('splashtop-business')
14options=('!strip')
15install=${pkgname}.install
16source=("https://download.splashtop.com/linuxclient/${pkgname}_Ubuntu_v${pkgver}_amd64.tar.gz")
17sha256sums=('128f9b7fe6ab15e2089339f76f325abaa97ac3657fa71d09b1fe4e87daf8430e')
18
19prepare(){
20 ar x splashtop-business_Ubuntu_amd64.deb
21}
22
23package(){
24 # Extract package data
25 tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
26
27 # Disable SRUsb.service until it's clear what it's purpose is
28 # Move unit file to correct location
29 # mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
30 # mv "$pkgdir/etc/systemd/system/SRUsb.service" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
31 rm -r "$pkgdir/etc/"
32
33 mkdir -m 777 "$pkgdir/opt/splashtop-business/config"
34 mkdir -m 755 "$pkgdir/opt/splashtop-business/dump"
35 mkdir -m 777 "$pkgdir/opt/splashtop-business/log"
36}
37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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