splashtop-business
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing a Debian .deb package with compiled executables) directly from download.splashtop.com, which is the official Splashtop vendor download host. This is a legitimate vendor distribution channel, not a personal or unofficial host, so the risk is lower than a random third-party mirror. However, the package still installs prebuilt proprietary binaries that cannot be audited, and there is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum. If the vendor host were compromised or the checksum were to drift, arbitrary code would execute. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary software distributed as prebuilt binaries from a vendor CDN in the AUR: not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the inability to verify the binary's integrity beyond a hash and the lack of source-build reproducibility.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:16
source=("https://download.splashtop.com/linuxclient/${pkgname}_Ubuntu_v${pkgver}_amd64.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing a Debian .deb package with compiled executables) directly from download.splashtop.com, which is the official Splashtop vendor download host. This is a legitimate vendor distribution channel, not a personal or unofficial host, so the risk is lower than a random third-party mirror. However, the package still installs prebuilt proprietary binaries that cannot be audited, and there is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum. If the vendor host were compromised or the checksum were to drift, arbitrary code would execute. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary software distributed as prebuilt binaries from a vendor CDN in the AUR: not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the inability to verify the binary's integrity beyond a hash and the lack of source-build reproducibility.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Andrew Simmons <agsimmons0 at gmail dot com>
# Contributor:: Tab Fitts <tfitts [at] spryservers [dot] net>
pkgname=splashtop-business
pkgver=3.8.0.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Splashtop Business. Remotely access your desktop from any device from anywhere!"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://www.splashtop.com/business"
license=('LicenseRef-Proprietary')
depends=('gcc-libs' 'glibc' 'keyutils' 'libcap' 'libpulse' 'libxcb' 'qt5-base' 'util-linux-libs' 'xcb-util-keysyms' 'xcb-util' 'xdotool' 'zlib')
optdepends=('bash-completion: Bash completion support')
provides=('splashtop-business')
options=('!strip')
install=${pkgname}.install
source=("https://download.splashtop.com/linuxclient/${pkgname}_Ubuntu_v${pkgver}_amd64.tar.gz")
sha256sums=('128f9b7fe6ab15e2089339f76f325abaa97ac3657fa71d09b1fe4e87daf8430e')
prepare(){
ar x splashtop-business_Ubuntu_amd64.deb
}
package(){
# Extract package data
tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
# Disable SRUsb.service until it's clear what it's purpose is
# Move unit file to correct location
# mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
# mv "$pkgdir/etc/systemd/system/SRUsb.service" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
rm -r "$pkgdir/etc/"
mkdir -m 777 "$pkgdir/opt/splashtop-business/config"
mkdir -m 755 "$pkgdir/opt/splashtop-business/dump"
mkdir -m 777 "$pkgdir/opt/splashtop-business/log"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |