squolem

maintainer xrchz · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary (squolem2) from cprover.org, which is the Computer Systems Group at Oxford/Cambridge — a legitimate academic research group, not a random personal host. However, the binary is still a prebuilt executable with no source build, and the URL uses HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning there is no transport security. The md5sums provide only weak integrity guarantees. The host (cprover.org) is a real academic institution hosting research tools (CBMC, etc.), so this is not a random personal page, but the combination of a prebuilt binary + HTTP + MD5-only verification does constitute a genuine supply-chain concern: a MITM or server compromise could substitute the binary. This is a legitimate MEDIUM: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a source that cannot be fully verified with modern standards.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:9 source=("http://www.cprover.org/qbv/download/$pkgname-$pkgver-linux.tgz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary (squolem2) from cprover.org, which is the Computer Systems Group at Oxford/Cambridge — a legitimate academic research group, not a random personal host. However, the binary is still a prebuilt executable with no source build, and the URL uses HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning there is no transport security. The md5sums provide only weak integrity guarantees. The host (cprover.org) is a real academic institution hosting research tools (CBMC, etc.), so this is not a random personal page, but the combination of a prebuilt binary + HTTP + MD5-only verification does constitute a genuine supply-chain concern: a MITM or server compromise could substitute the binary. This is a legitimate MEDIUM: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a source that cannot be fully verified with modern standards.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Ramana Kumar <firstname.lastname@gmail.com>
2pkgname=squolem
3pkgver=2.02
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Skolemization-based Quantified Boolean Formula (QBF) solver that generates certificates"
6arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
7url="http://www.cprover.org/qbv/"
8license=('custom:qbv')
9source=("http://www.cprover.org/qbv/download/$pkgname-$pkgver-linux.tgz"
10 "http://www.cprover.org/qbv/LICENSE.txt")
11md5sums=('3c142f4412a7e764bad4378627cbd4cf'
12 '38a6fbe518e813958238518ce2cff077')
13
14package() {
15 install -D "$srcdir/squolem2" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/squolem2"
16 install -D -m644 "$srcdir/LICENSE.txt" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
17}
18
19# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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