sreda

maintainer potapovjakov · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary archive from dl.armgs.team, which is a non-official, third-party host (not the canonical sreda.digital.gov.ru government domain). The entire extracted archive contents are copied wholesale into /opt/sreda with 'cp -a srcdir/.' which installs whatever binaries/libraries are in the tarball. While a sha256sum is present, the trust anchor is only as strong as the host: if dl.armgs.team is compromised or controlled by an unrelated party, the checksum in the PKGBUILD would need to be updated to reflect a malicious payload — but the current checksum does not guarantee the host is trustworthy going forward. The package installs executed native binaries from a non-canonical host for what is described as a Russian government employee communication service, which is a genuine supply-chain concern. This is a real medium-severity issue: prebuilt binaries from an unofficial/personal-team host being installed and executed on the user's system.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:18 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.xz::https://dl.armgs.team/downloads/linux/x64/${pkgver}/${_app_name}"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary archive from dl.armgs.team, which is a non-official, third-party host (not the canonical sreda.digital.gov.ru government domain). The entire extracted archive contents are copied wholesale into /opt/sreda with 'cp -a srcdir/.' which installs whatever binaries/libraries are in the tarball. While a sha256sum is present, the trust anchor is only as strong as the host: if dl.armgs.team is compromised or controlled by an unrelated party, the checksum in the PKGBUILD would need to be updated to reflect a malicious payload — but the current checksum does not guarantee the host is trustworthy going forward. The package installs executed native binaries from a non-canonical host for what is described as a Russian government employee communication service, which is a genuine supply-chain concern. This is a real medium-severity issue: prebuilt binaries from an unofficial/personal-team host being installed and executed on the user's system.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Yakov P potapovj(at)gmail(dot)com
    
      2# Maintainer: KUHTOXO https://aur.archlinux.org/account/kuhtoxo
    
      3pkgname=sreda
    
      4pkgver=26.1.10.85335
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Service for interaction between employees in organizations."
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://sreda.digital.gov.ru/"
    
      9license=('proprietary')
    
      10options=(!strip)
    
      11replaces=('armgs')
    
      12
    
      13_install_path="/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      14_archive_name="${pkgname}.tar.xz"
    
      15_app_name="${pkgname}.tar.xz"
    
      16
    
      17source=(
    
      18	"${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.xz::https://dl.armgs.team/downloads/linux/x64/${pkgver}/${_app_name}"
    
      19	"sreda.desktop"
    
      20)
    
      21sha256sums=('74c29b8bd1b5322d9784c73c221a948f6af30f788649654837c8f18bac0aecc1'
    
      22            '4cd9a7f70e029a3501af880f4839ad1a52de104ad989e1b0aa1817bfa90675aa')
    
      23
    
      24package() {
    
      25	mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      26	cp -a "${srcdir}/." "${pkgdir}${_install_path}/"
    
      27	rm "${pkgdir}${_install_path}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.xz"
    
      28	mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
    
      29	cp -L "${pkgname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
    
      30	rm "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.desktop"
    
      31}
    
      32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2