stacher7

maintainer BoredYama · 4 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary Electron binary (.deb) from 's7-releases.stacher-cloud.com', which is a project-specific subdomain rather than a well-known official distribution channel (e.g., GitHub releases). The binary is executed directly after extraction. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the point of download, but does not address the risk of the upstream host serving a malicious binary in the first place (the hash would need to be updated per release). The host 'stacher-cloud.com' appears to be the project's own release infrastructure for Stacher (stacher.io), so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own CDN/release server. This is a common pattern for proprietary AUR packages (e.g., similar to how Slack, Discord, etc. are packaged). The main concern is that 'stacher-cloud.com' is not a widely audited infrastructure, and the package installs a closed-source Electron app binary. This is a genuine medium-level supply-chain concern (unofficial/project-specific binary host, closed-source executed code), but not clearly malicious. No piracy or broken flags apply.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=("stacher7_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://s7-releases.stacher-cloud.com/s7-releases/stacher7_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary Electron binary (.deb) from 's7-releases.stacher-cloud.com', which is a project-specific subdomain rather than a well-known official distribution channel (e.g., GitHub releases). The binary is executed directly after extraction. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the point of download, but does not address the risk of the upstream host serving a malicious binary in the first place (the hash would need to be updated per release). The host 'stacher-cloud.com' appears to be the project's own release infrastructure for Stacher (stacher.io), so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own CDN/release server. This is a common pattern for proprietary AUR packages (e.g., similar to how Slack, Discord, etc. are packaged). The main concern is that 'stacher-cloud.com' is not a widely audited infrastructure, and the package installs a closed-source Electron app binary. This is a genuine medium-level supply-chain concern (unofficial/project-specific binary host, closed-source executed code), but not clearly malicious. No piracy or broken flags apply.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: BoredYama <sagargaud88@gmail.com>
2pkgname=stacher7
3pkgver=7.1.9
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Stacher - modern video downloader (proprietary Electron app)"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://stacher.io"
8license=('LicenseRef-freeware')
9depends=('glibc' 'gtk3' 'nss' 'alsa-lib')
10makedepends=('tar' 'zstd')
11provides=('stacher7')
12conflicts=('stacher7')
13options=('!strip')
14# Using the working URL you found - note: query parameter might change over time
15source=("stacher7_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://s7-releases.stacher-cloud.com/s7-releases/stacher7_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
16sha256sums=('8dd26fb0570bccdb02b6d9a74c3cd581b0d8de0bda74aa848a777fa3a88152af')
17
18package() {
19 # Extract the .deb
20 ar x "${srcdir}/stacher7_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
21 mkdir -p extracted
22 tar --use-compress-program=unzstd -xf data.tar.zst -C extracted
23
24 # Install to /opt (standard location for proprietary software)
25 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
26 if [[ -d "extracted/usr/lib/${pkgname}" ]]; then
27 cp -r extracted/usr/lib/${pkgname}/* "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
28 fi
29
30 # Symlink main binary to /usr/bin
31 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
32 if [[ -f "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/Stacher7" ]]; then
33 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/Stacher7" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
34 fi
35
36 # Install desktop entry
37 if [[ -f "extracted/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop" ]]; then
38 install -Dm644 "extracted/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop" \
39 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
40 fi
41
42 # Install icon
43 if [[ -f "extracted/usr/share/pixmaps/${pkgname}.png" ]]; then
44 install -Dm644 "extracted/usr/share/pixmaps/${pkgname}.png" \
45 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/${pkgname}.png"
46 fi
47
48 # Install license if available
49 if [[ -f "extracted/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/copyright" ]]; then
50 install -Dm644 "extracted/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/copyright" \
51 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
52 fi
53}
54

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion