strum-machine

maintainer kyriesenbach · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app builder/distributor used by many commercial apps). The binary is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract and then installed. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and not a random personal host, it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's an intermediary build/distribution platform. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk somewhat, but the hash cannot be independently verified against an official vendor-published checksum. The URL path (/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64) is opaque and version-independent, meaning the same URL could serve different content over time if ToDesktop's CDN is compromised or the app owner updates it without changing the PKGBUILD. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-upstream-controlled third-party host with no independent checksum verification, though not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://dl.todesktop.com/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app builder/distributor used by many commercial apps). The binary is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract and then installed. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and not a random personal host, it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's an intermediary build/distribution platform. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk somewhat, but the hash cannot be independently verified against an official vendor-published checksum. The URL path (/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64) is opaque and version-independent, meaning the same URL could serve different content over time if ToDesktop's CDN is compromised or the app owner updates it without changing the PKGBUILD. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-upstream-controlled third-party host with no independent checksum verification, though not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Aaron Ky-Riesenbach <archaur.carve665@passmail.net>
2
3_basename=Strum-Machine
4
5pkgname=strum-machine
6pkgver=1.1.2
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="Official Electron wrapper for Strum Machine"
9arch=('x86_64')
10url="strummachine.com"
11options=(!strip)
12_appimage="${_basename}-${pkgver}-${arch[0]}.AppImage"
13source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://dl.todesktop.com/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64")
14noextract=("${_appimage}")
15sha256sums_x86_64=('b162e41b43f5547b09f4b1b7ca83e6f20cc5223e04095cb9af654ab9ef152a48')
16
17prepare() {
18 chmod +x "${_appimage}"
19 ./"${_appimage}" --appimage-extract
20}
21
22build() {
23 # Adjust .desktop so it will work outside of AppImage container
24 sed -i -E "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=env DESKTOPINTEGRATION=false /usr/bin/${pkgname}|"\
25 "squashfs-root/${_basename}.desktop"
26 # Fix permissions; .AppImage permissions are 700 for all directories
27 chmod -R a-x+rX squashfs-root/usr
28}
29
30package() {
31 # AppImage
32 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${_appimage}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
33
34 # Desktop file
35 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${_basename}.desktop"\
36 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
37
38 # Icon images
39 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
40 cp -a "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
41
42 # Symlink executable
43 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
44 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion