strum-machine

MEDIUM

maintainer kyriesenbach 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app builder/distributor used by many commercial apps). The binary is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract and then installed. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and not a random personal host, it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's an intermediary build/distribution platform. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk somewhat, but the hash cannot be independently verified against an official vendor-published checksum. The URL path (/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64) is opaque and version-independent, meaning the same URL could serve different content over time if ToDesktop's CDN is compromised or the app owner updates it without changing the PKGBUILD. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-upstream-controlled third-party host with no independent checksum verification, though not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:13 source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://dl.todesktop.com/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app builder/distributor used by many commercial apps). The binary is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract and then installed. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and not a random personal host, it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's an intermediary build/distribution platform. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk somewhat, but the hash cannot be independently verified against an official vendor-published checksum. The URL path (/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64) is opaque and version-independent, meaning the same URL could serve different content over time if ToDesktop's CDN is compromised or the app owner updates it without changing the PKGBUILD. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-upstream-controlled third-party host with no independent checksum verification, though not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Aaron Ky-Riesenbach <archaur.carve665@passmail.net>
    
      2
    
      3_basename=Strum-Machine
    
      4
    
      5pkgname=strum-machine
    
      6pkgver=1.1.2
    
      7pkgrel=1
    
      8pkgdesc="Official Electron wrapper for Strum Machine"
    
      9arch=('x86_64')
    
      10url="strummachine.com"
    
      11options=(!strip)
    
      12_appimage="${_basename}-${pkgver}-${arch[0]}.AppImage"
    
      13source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://dl.todesktop.com/2311067sn5jju9o/linux/appImage/x64")
    
      14noextract=("${_appimage}")
    
      15sha256sums_x86_64=('b162e41b43f5547b09f4b1b7ca83e6f20cc5223e04095cb9af654ab9ef152a48')
    
      16
    
      17prepare() {
    
      18    chmod +x "${_appimage}"
    
      19    ./"${_appimage}" --appimage-extract
    
      20}
    
      21
    
      22build() {
    
      23    # Adjust .desktop so it will work outside of AppImage container
    
      24    sed -i -E "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=env DESKTOPINTEGRATION=false /usr/bin/${pkgname}|"\
    
      25        "squashfs-root/${_basename}.desktop"
    
      26    # Fix permissions; .AppImage permissions are 700 for all directories
    
      27    chmod -R a-x+rX squashfs-root/usr
    
      28}
    
      29
    
      30package() {
    
      31    # AppImage
    
      32    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${_appimage}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
    
      33
    
      34    # Desktop file
    
      35    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${_basename}.desktop"\
    
      36            "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
    
      37
    
      38    # Icon images
    
      39    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
    
      40    cp -a "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
    
      41
    
      42    # Symlink executable
    
      43    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      44    ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      45}
    
      46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2