sugarchain-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD installs pre-compiled binaries from a GitHub release of a relatively obscure cryptocurrency project (sugarchain), which is a supply-chain concern in itself. The check() function fetches a GPG key from keybase.io at build time via curl piped directly to gpg --import, which is a TOFU (trust on first use) pattern — if keybase.io is compromised or the key is substituted, the verification provides no real protection. The SHA256SUMS.asc file is also fetched at runtime (not in source=() with a pinned hash), meaning its integrity is not guaranteed before use. The binary tarball itself is in source=() with a pinned sha256sum, which is the main protection. However, the overall pattern — executing downloaded pre-built binaries from a niche crypto project, with a GPG verification scheme that can be trivially bypassed by a compromised key host — constitutes a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern. It is not clearly malicious, but the trust chain is weak.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

PKGBUILD:19 curl https://keybase.io/decryp2kanon/pgp_keys.asc | gpg --import

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs pre-compiled binaries from a GitHub release of a relatively obscure cryptocurrency project (sugarchain), which is a supply-chain concern in itself. The check() function fetches a GPG key from keybase.io at build time via curl piped directly to gpg --import, which is a TOFU (trust on first use) pattern — if keybase.io is compromised or the key is substituted, the verification provides no real protection. The SHA256SUMS.asc file is also fetched at runtime (not in source=() with a pinned hash), meaning its integrity is not guaranteed before use. The binary tarball itself is in source=() with a pinned sha256sum, which is the main protection. However, the overall pattern — executing downloaded pre-built binaries from a niche crypto project, with a GPG verification scheme that can be trivially bypassed by a compromised key host — constitutes a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern. It is not clearly malicious, but the trust chain is weak.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Sandelinos
    
      2pkgname=sugarchain-bin
    
      3pkgver=0.16.3.34_starboy
    
      4pkgrel=2
    
      5pkgdesc="Sugarchain: one-CPU-one-vote, the world's fastest PoW blockchain"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://sugarchain.org"
    
      8license=('MIT')
    
      9depends=('boost' 'boost-libs' 'zeromq' 'libevent')
    
      10optdepends=('qt5-base')
    
      11
    
      12_signatures="https://github.com/sugarchain-project/sugarchain/releases/download/v${pkgver//_/-}/SHA256SUMS.asc"
    
      13source=("https://github.com/sugarchain-project/sugarchain/releases/download/v${pkgver//_/-}/sugarchain-${pkgver//_/-}-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz")
    
      14sha256sums=('4a79d2bb85c306fa37b57ab5790931103e4311b7dc8edeca4c86c3ec26590b62')
    
      15
    
      16check() {
    
      17  msg 'Validating GPG signature...'
    
      18  msg2 '(To disable: remove/rename check() function from PKGBUILD)'
    
      19  curl https://keybase.io/decryp2kanon/pgp_keys.asc | gpg --import
    
      20#  gpg --recv-key B9DDBDE2AAADC421 # this is Cryptozeny's key
    
      21  curl -sL $_signatures -o SHA256SUMS.asc
    
      22  msg2 "Downloading $_signatures"
    
      23  gpg --verify 'SHA256SUMS.asc'
    
      24  msg2 'GPG signature is valid.'
    
      25
    
      26  msg 'Validating signed checksum of downloaded archive...'
    
      27  grep "sugarchain-${pkgver//_/-}-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz" 'SHA256SUMS.asc' | tr -d '\r' | sha256sum -c -
    
      28  msg2 'Checksum valid.'
    
      29}
    
      30
    
      31package() {
    
      32  tar xf "$srcdir/sugarchain-${pkgver//_/-}-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
    
      33  install -Dm644 $srcdir/sugarchain-0.16.3/share/man/man1/* -t $pkgdir/usr/share/man/man1
    
      34  install -Dm755 $srcdir/sugarchain-0.16.3/bin/* -t $pkgdir/usr/bin
    
      35}
    
      36
    
      37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2