sys-pc-tool
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("https://www.syride.com/downloads/$pkgname-$pkgver-$pkgrel""_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the vendor's own website (syride.com), extracts it, and installs the binaries directly. The vendor host is the official upstream (url matches source domain), so this is not a personal/unofficial host. However, the package installs prebuilt closed-source binaries with no source build, and uses only an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, no SHA256/b2). The real concern is that prebuilt binaries from any host — even the official vendor — represent a supply-chain risk if the vendor site is compromised or the binary is silently updated. The license is 'unknown', suggesting proprietary software. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed closed-source binary from a vendor host with only MD5 verification, not a false positive, but also not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Antoine Maleyrie <antoine.maleyrie@gmail.com>
pkgname=sys-pc-tool
pkgver=6.32
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="SYS PC Tool is a software for downloading flights recorded inside Syrides instruments."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://www.syride.com/"
license=('unknown')
depends=('glibc>=2.17' 'krb5>=1.10' 'libldap' 'gtk2' 'libusb' 'libxml2' 'p11-kit' 'openssl' 'libcurl-gnutls')
#install=
source=("https://www.syride.com/downloads/$pkgname-$pkgver-$pkgrel""_amd64.deb")
md5sums=('d044cf3d89c6bca437ae2d665c564f61')
prepare() {
tar -xf data.tar.xz
}
package() {
cp -r "usr/local/" "$pkgdir/usr/"
mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/local/share/"
cp -r "usr/local/share/syride/" "$pkgdir/usr/local/share/"
mkdir -p "$pkgdir/etc/udev/rules.d/"
cp "lib/udev/rules.d/96-syride.rules" "$pkgdir/etc/udev/rules.d/"
# To update udev ruls:
# $ udevadm control --reload
# $ udevadm trigger
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |