tabnine

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary binary from update.tabnine.com (the official Tabnine update server) and installs it directly into /usr/bin. While update.tabnine.com is the legitimate vendor update domain, this is still a prebuilt binary from a non-source, non-standard host with no source code available for inspection. The sha256sums provide integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but the binary itself is opaque and could contain anything. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed proprietary binary from a vendor update endpoint rather than a verifiable source build. The cheaper model's assessment is correct here — this is a genuine medium risk pattern (prebuilt binary, no source, proprietary), not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source_x86_64=("$pkgname-$pkgver-x86_64.zip::https://update.tabnine.com/bundles/$pkgver/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/TabNine.zip")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary binary from update.tabnine.com (the official Tabnine update server) and installs it directly into /usr/bin. While update.tabnine.com is the legitimate vendor update domain, this is still a prebuilt binary from a non-source, non-standard host with no source code available for inspection. The sha256sums provide integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but the binary itself is opaque and could contain anything. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed proprietary binary from a vendor update endpoint rather than a verifiable source build. The cheaper model's assessment is correct here — this is a genuine medium risk pattern (prebuilt binary, no source, proprietary), not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Luis Martinez <luis dot martinez at disroot dot org>
2
3pkgname=tabnine
4pkgver=3.7.25
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="AI-powered autocompletion engine"
7arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
8url="https://tabnine.com"
9license=('custom:proprietary')
10source=('TERMS')
11source_x86_64=("$pkgname-$pkgver-x86_64.zip::https://update.tabnine.com/bundles/$pkgver/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/TabNine.zip")
12source_i686=("$pkgname-$pkgver-i686.zip::https://update.tabnine.com/bundles/$pkgver/i686-unknown-linux-musl/TabNine.zip")
13sha256sums=('77177f1e237c7139a241da39c9f7ef736e0c2677587e4a1fc4959097b93ba99e')
14sha256sums_x86_64=('3a7f92a249b6f8157725b2302bca0f3baf3cd85396065812680a77540c91f913')
15sha256sums_i686=('068ee1f0f676cd1a3edb718e8cc3ddf0ae2e82474a5cca88e9474b9b5469befa')
16
17package() {
18 install -D TabNine -t "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
19 ln -s /usr/bin/TabNine "$pkgdir/usr/bin/tabnine"
20 install -Dm 644 TERMS -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/"
21}
22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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