taproot-assets-bin
LOW
maintainer pizzaman
1 votes
scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
Why flagged
The external download is from the project's official GitHub releases, which is a legitimate source; the curl command in comments is instructional and not executed, posing no real risk.
Triggered rules
Low
AI review downgraded a static finding
llm_review
The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (qwen/qwen3-235b-a22b-07-25) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 95%): The external download is from the project's official GitHub releases, which is a legitimate source; the curl command in comments is instructional and not executed, posing no real risk.
1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
Medium
External download from an untrusted host, not in source=()
external_download_not_in_source
curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.
-
PKGBUILD:28
curl https://keybase.io/guggero/pgp_keys.asc | gpg --import
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted
1
# Maintainer: Luis Aranguren <pizzaman@hotmail.com
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_pkgname=taproot-assets
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pkgname=${_pkgname}-bin
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pkgver=0.6.0
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_pkgver="${pkgver//_/-}"
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pkgrel=1
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pkgdesc="A layer 1 daemon, for the Taproot Assets Protocol specification, written in Go (golang)"
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arch=('any')
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_arch=linux-amd64
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url="https://github.com/lightninglabs/${_pkgname}"
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license=("MIT")
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depends=("lnd")
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provides=("${_pkgname}" "${_pkgname}d")
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source=(
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${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}.tar.gz::"${url}/releases/download/v$_pkgver/${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}.tar.gz"
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manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt.sig::"${url}/releases/download/v${_pkgver}/manifest-guggero-v${_pkgver}.sig"
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manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt::"${url}/releases/download/v${_pkgver}/manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt"
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)
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sha256sums=('9351c7658933f7ed3bb41ff7b2eec020f5b1c862688f2ea32bb225ea046b4b93'
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'SKIP'
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'8dcb12addca7711943ead04904b9beb6d6da4e231f46829ec00e5e6978fb394a')
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# LND provides manifest signatures from several developers
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# To wit; guggero and roasbeef
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# To import their keys run
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curl https://keybase.io/guggero/pgp_keys.asc | gpg --import
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#curl https://keybase.io/roasbeef/pgp_keys.sig | gpg --import
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# But of course don't trust this rando AUR comment - verify yourself that the keybase accounts really belong to the developers.
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validpgpkeys=(
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'F4FC70F07310028424EFC20A8E4256593F177720'
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# 'E4D85299674B2D31FAA1892E372CBD7633C61696'
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)
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prepare() {
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# verify release
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gpg --verify "manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt.sig" "manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt"
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cat "manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt" \
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| grep "^[0-9a-f]\{64\} ${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}\(\.tar\.gz\)$" \
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| sha256sum -c -
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}
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package() {
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install -Dm 755 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}/tapcli" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin";
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install -Dm 755 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}/tapd" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin";
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}
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Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Low | 2 |