taproot-assets-bin

maintainer pizzaman · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
LOW
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The external download is from the project's official GitHub releases, which is a legitimate source; the curl command in comments is instructional and not executed, posing no real risk.

Triggered rules

LOW AI review downgraded a static finding llm_review

The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (qwen/qwen3-235b-a22b-07-25) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 95%): The external download is from the project's official GitHub releases, which is a legitimate source; the curl command in comments is instructional and not executed, posing no real risk.

1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

  • PKGBUILD:28 curl https://keybase.io/guggero/pgp_keys.asc | gpg --import

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Luis Aranguren <pizzaman@hotmail.com
2_pkgname=taproot-assets
3pkgname=${_pkgname}-bin
4pkgver=0.6.0
5_pkgver="${pkgver//_/-}"
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="A layer 1 daemon, for the Taproot Assets Protocol specification, written in Go (golang)"
8arch=('any')
9_arch=linux-amd64
10url="https://github.com/lightninglabs/${_pkgname}"
11license=("MIT")
12depends=("lnd")
13provides=("${_pkgname}" "${_pkgname}d")
14
15source=(
16${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}.tar.gz::"${url}/releases/download/v$_pkgver/${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}.tar.gz"
17manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt.sig::"${url}/releases/download/v${_pkgver}/manifest-guggero-v${_pkgver}.sig"
18manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt::"${url}/releases/download/v${_pkgver}/manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt"
19)
20
21sha256sums=('9351c7658933f7ed3bb41ff7b2eec020f5b1c862688f2ea32bb225ea046b4b93'
22 'SKIP'
23 '8dcb12addca7711943ead04904b9beb6d6da4e231f46829ec00e5e6978fb394a')
24
25# LND provides manifest signatures from several developers
26# To wit; guggero and roasbeef
27# To import their keys run
28curl https://keybase.io/guggero/pgp_keys.asc | gpg --import
29#curl https://keybase.io/roasbeef/pgp_keys.sig | gpg --import
30# But of course don't trust this rando AUR comment - verify yourself that the keybase accounts really belong to the developers.
31validpgpkeys=(
32 'F4FC70F07310028424EFC20A8E4256593F177720'
33 # 'E4D85299674B2D31FAA1892E372CBD7633C61696'
34)
35
36prepare() {
37 # verify release
38 gpg --verify "manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt.sig" "manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt"
39
40 cat "manifest-v${_pkgver}.txt" \
41 | grep "^[0-9a-f]\{64\} ${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}\(\.tar\.gz\)$" \
42 | sha256sum -c -
43}
44
45package() {
46 install -Dm 755 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}/tapcli" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin";
47 install -Dm 755 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}-${_arch}-v${_pkgver}/tapd" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin";
48}
49

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 LOW 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 LOW 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 LOW 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 LOW 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 LOW 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 LOW 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 LOW 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 LOW 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 LOW 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 LOW 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 LOW 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 LOW 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 LOW 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 LOW 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 LOW 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 LOW 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 LOW 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 LOW 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 LOW 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 LOW 2

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