tbdel

MEDIUM

maintainer mahdium 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt x86_64 binary from a personal/self-hosted Gitea instance (git.mahdium.ir) maintained by the package author. This is not an official distribution channel like GitHub, GitLab, or a distro mirror — it is a personal server that could be compromised, taken down, or silently replaced. The binary is executed directly on the user's system (installed to /usr/bin/tbdel). A sha256 checksum is present, which provides integrity verification against the specific downloaded artifact, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary in the first place (the checksum would simply be updated). There is no source code build from a verifiable VCS, no reproducible build, and no third-party attestation. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from an unofficial personal host. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice, so MEDIUM is the correct rating.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source_x86_64=("https://git.mahdium.ir/mahdium/TBDel/releases/download/v${pkgver}/tbdel-v${pkgver}-linux-64.tar.xz")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt x86_64 binary from a personal/self-hosted Gitea instance (git.mahdium.ir) maintained by the package author. This is not an official distribution channel like GitHub, GitLab, or a distro mirror — it is a personal server that could be compromised, taken down, or silently replaced. The binary is executed directly on the user's system (installed to /usr/bin/tbdel). A sha256 checksum is present, which provides integrity verification against the specific downloaded artifact, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary in the first place (the checksum would simply be updated). There is no source code build from a verifiable VCS, no reproducible build, and no third-party attestation. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from an unofficial personal host. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice, so MEDIUM is the correct rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Mohammad Mahdi <me@mahdium.ir>
    
      2pkgname=tbdel
    
      3pkgver=3
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="A simple command-line tool for managing a list of files and directories marked for deletion. User can add, remove, list, and execute the deletion of these entries."
    
      6url="https://git.mahdium.ir/mahdium/TBDel"
    
      7license=('AGPL3')
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9provides=("tbdel=$pkgver")
    
      10
    
      11source_x86_64=("https://git.mahdium.ir/mahdium/TBDel/releases/download/v${pkgver}/tbdel-v${pkgver}-linux-64.tar.xz")
    
      12sha256sums_x86_64=(f3de937bbe41e5c1110bb003b64bf986fb075cf8ee8656eb4c3914bab59f3a9a)
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15    cd "$srcdir"
    
      16    install -D tbdel-v${pkgver}-linux-64 "$pkgdir/usr/bin/tbdel"
    
      17}
    
      18

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2