teamtalk-client
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from bearware.dk (the official TeamTalk project website) and installs it directly into /opt. The host is the legitimate upstream vendor site for TeamTalk, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: prebuilt binaries from any external host (even the official one) bypass source compilation and reproducibility, meaning a compromised upstream host or a MITM could deliver malicious executables. The sha256sums provide some protection against tampering in transit, but do not protect against the upstream host itself being compromised and serving a new binary with updated checksums. The binary is also built for Ubuntu 22 and installed on Arch, which is a compatibility concern but not a security one. Overall this is a legitimate but supply-chain-risky pattern (prebuilt binary from upstream vendor), which fits the medium classification — not a false positive, but also not clearly malicious.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("https://bearware.dk/${_dlname}/v${pkgver}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}.tgz"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from bearware.dk (the official TeamTalk project website) and installs it directly into /opt. The host is the legitimate upstream vendor site for TeamTalk, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: prebuilt binaries from any external host (even the official one) bypass source compilation and reproducibility, meaning a compromised upstream host or a MITM could deliver malicious executables. The sha256sums provide some protection against tampering in transit, but do not protect against the upstream host itself being compromised and serving a new binary with updated checksums. The binary is also built for Ubuntu 22 and installed on Arch, which is a compatibility concern but not a security one. Overall this is a legitimate but supply-chain-risky pattern (prebuilt binary from upstream vendor), which fits the medium classification — not a false positive, but also not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jeremiah Ticket <seashellpromises@gmail.com>
pkgname=('teamtalk-client')
pkgver=5.22
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='a software conferencing system client which enables a group of people to collaborate and share information using voice and video'
arch=('x86_64')
depends=('gcc-libs' 'qt5-base' 'qt5-multimedia' 'qt5-speech' 'qt5-x11extras' 'openssl')
install="${pkgname}.install"
license=('custom')
url='http://www.bearware.dk'
_dlname='teamtalk'
source=("https://bearware.dk/${_dlname}/v${pkgver}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}.tgz"
"${pkgname}.install" "TeamTalk.desktop" "teamtalk")
sha256sums=('c9eeb88e7c8c26f796eeff783d382a7bd36666c8a090c201cb758f5a6aeb9376'
'6a2e562a3eab75d51a7f8c26b892914c3f163575598c7891901cfe78a215d813'
'7b025ff93113a4b6b957155c56b4c10b62d193d001d3b8ae755e3c830037609e'
'a7df5f7a6503d7ee32351fda207bcac6996d98f25b027f72aa26a20eb6702fa5')
package() {
install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}/License.txt ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${_dlname}/LICENSE
install -dm755 $pkgdir/opt/teamtalk-client/
install -Dm644 TeamTalk.desktop $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/TeamTalk.desktop
install -Dm755 teamtalk $pkgdir/usr/bin/teamtalk
cp -r ${srcdir}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}/client/* $pkgdir/opt/teamtalk-client/
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |