teamtalk-client

maintainer jticket1024 · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from bearware.dk (the official TeamTalk project website) and installs it directly into /opt. The host is the legitimate upstream vendor site for TeamTalk, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: prebuilt binaries from any external host (even the official one) bypass source compilation and reproducibility, meaning a compromised upstream host or a MITM could deliver malicious executables. The sha256sums provide some protection against tampering in transit, but do not protect against the upstream host itself being compromised and serving a new binary with updated checksums. The binary is also built for Ubuntu 22 and installed on Arch, which is a compatibility concern but not a security one. Overall this is a legitimate but supply-chain-risky pattern (prebuilt binary from upstream vendor), which fits the medium classification — not a false positive, but also not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("https://bearware.dk/${_dlname}/v${pkgver}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}.tgz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from bearware.dk (the official TeamTalk project website) and installs it directly into /opt. The host is the legitimate upstream vendor site for TeamTalk, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: prebuilt binaries from any external host (even the official one) bypass source compilation and reproducibility, meaning a compromised upstream host or a MITM could deliver malicious executables. The sha256sums provide some protection against tampering in transit, but do not protect against the upstream host itself being compromised and serving a new binary with updated checksums. The binary is also built for Ubuntu 22 and installed on Arch, which is a compatibility concern but not a security one. Overall this is a legitimate but supply-chain-risky pattern (prebuilt binary from upstream vendor), which fits the medium classification — not a false positive, but also not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Jeremiah Ticket <seashellpromises@gmail.com>
2pkgname=('teamtalk-client')
3pkgver=5.22
4pkgrel=1
5 pkgdesc='a software conferencing system client which enables a group of people to collaborate and share information using voice and video'
6arch=('x86_64')
7 depends=('gcc-libs' 'qt5-base' 'qt5-multimedia' 'qt5-speech' 'qt5-x11extras' 'openssl')
8 install="${pkgname}.install"
9license=('custom')
10url='http://www.bearware.dk'
11_dlname='teamtalk'
12source=("https://bearware.dk/${_dlname}/v${pkgver}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}.tgz"
13 "${pkgname}.install" "TeamTalk.desktop" "teamtalk")
14sha256sums=('c9eeb88e7c8c26f796eeff783d382a7bd36666c8a090c201cb758f5a6aeb9376'
15 '6a2e562a3eab75d51a7f8c26b892914c3f163575598c7891901cfe78a215d813'
16 '7b025ff93113a4b6b957155c56b4c10b62d193d001d3b8ae755e3c830037609e'
17 'a7df5f7a6503d7ee32351fda207bcac6996d98f25b027f72aa26a20eb6702fa5')
18
19package() {
20 install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}/License.txt ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${_dlname}/LICENSE
21 install -dm755 $pkgdir/opt/teamtalk-client/
22 install -Dm644 TeamTalk.desktop $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/TeamTalk.desktop
23 install -Dm755 teamtalk $pkgdir/usr/bin/teamtalk
24cp -r ${srcdir}/${_dlname}-v${pkgver}-ubuntu22-${arch}/client/* $pkgdir/opt/teamtalk-client/
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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