tencent-transmart-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from cdn.transmart.qq.com, which is Tencent's own CDN for their TranSmart translation product. The host is a Tencent-operated CDN (qq.com domain), so it is not a random personal host — it is the official vendor distribution channel for this proprietary application. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary from a proprietary vendor (Tencent), which inherently carries supply-chain risk: the binary could contain telemetry, backdoors, or other unwanted functionality, and users must trust Tencent's CDN integrity. This is the standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt proprietary binary packages in the AUR — not clearly malicious, but not verifiable source code either. The cheaper model's concern about the non-standard host is partially valid but overstated: cdn.transmart.qq.com is the official Tencent CDN, not a personal or unofficial host. The risk is the standard prebuilt-binary supply-chain concern, not an active attack. Rating remains medium due to the executed prebuilt binary from a closed-source vendor, even though the host is legitimate.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:30
"${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://cdn.transmart.qq.com/installation_pro/${_appname}_${pkgver}(20230713)_linux.tar.gz"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from cdn.transmart.qq.com, which is Tencent's own CDN for their TranSmart translation product. The host is a Tencent-operated CDN (qq.com domain), so it is not a random personal host — it is the official vendor distribution channel for this proprietary application. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary from a proprietary vendor (Tencent), which inherently carries supply-chain risk: the binary could contain telemetry, backdoors, or other unwanted functionality, and users must trust Tencent's CDN integrity. This is the standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt proprietary binary packages in the AUR — not clearly malicious, but not verifiable source code either. The cheaper model's concern about the non-standard host is partially valid but overstated: cdn.transmart.qq.com is the official Tencent CDN, not a personal or unofficial host. The risk is the standard prebuilt-binary supply-chain concern, not an active attack. Rating remains medium due to the executed prebuilt binary from a closed-source vendor, even though the host is legitimate.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: zxp19821005 <zxp19821005 at 163 dot com>
_pkgname=transmart
pkgname="tencent-${_pkgname}-bin"
_appname=TranSmart
_zhsname='腾讯交互翻译'
pkgver=Alpha0.10.1
pkgrel=9
pkgdesc="腾讯交互翻译融合了腾讯人工智能实验室自研的交互式机器翻译、神经网络机器翻译、 统计机器翻译、语义理解、信息检索等技术,帮助用户更快、更好地完成翻译任务。"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://transmart.qq.com/"
license=('LicenseRef-custom')
provides=("${pkgname%-bin}=${pkgver}")
conflicts=("${pkgname%-bin}")
depends=(
'qt5-base'
'alsa-lib'
'qt6-declarative'
'openssl-1.1'
'nspr'
'nss'
)
makedepends=(
'gendesk'
)
optdepends=(
'fcitx-qt5'
)
options=('!strip')
source=(
"${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://cdn.transmart.qq.com/installation_pro/${_appname}_${pkgver}(20230713)_linux.tar.gz"
"${pkgname%-bin}.sh"
)
sha256sums=('acef0abb8fc0af1fa11514ceb5ea3f615c132e2c7770c58cfb9ca29f571ad3d7'
'edf41565ee37d6a8ee184307ca75908e932b4df15b2690a268d41ec65a0a71a7')
prepare() {
sed -i -e "
s/@appname@/${pkgname%-bin}/g
s/@runname@/${_appname}/g
" "${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}.sh"
gendesk -q -f -n \
--pkgname="tencent-${_pkgname}-bin" \
--name="${_appname}" \
--categories="Utility" \
--mimetypes="x-scheme-handler/${_pkgname}" \
--exec="${pkgname%-bin} %F"
sed -i "3i\Name[zh_CN]=${_zhsname}" "${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}.desktop"
mv "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_linux/使用说明" "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_linux/README"
}
package() {
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}.sh" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname%-bin}"
install -Dm755 -d "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/${pkgname%-bin}"
cp -Pr --no-preserve=ownership "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_linux/"* "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/${pkgname%-bin}"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_linux/README" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_linux/logo.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/${pkgname%-bin}.png"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |