ti-cgt-arm-clang
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.bin) from dr-download.ti.com, which is Texas Instruments' official software distribution domain (used for CCS, compilers, and other TI tools). The domain is legitimate TI infrastructure, not a personal or unofficial host. However, the package executes this binary installer directly (chmod +x then runs it with --mode unattended), which is a genuine supply-chain concern: if TI's download server were compromised or the URL were redirected, an arbitrary binary would execute with package build privileges. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the network level. The pattern of wrapping a vendor installer binary in a PKGBUILD is common in the AUR for proprietary tools (e.g., various TI, Xilinx, Intel packages) and is not inherently malicious. The medium rating is appropriate: it's an executed binary from a vendor host with a checksum, which is the standard AUR pattern for proprietary toolchain packages, but the execution of an opaque binary installer remains a real (if accepted) supply-chain risk class.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:17
source=("https://dr-download.ti.com/software-development/ide-configuration-compiler-or-debugger/MD-ayxs93eZNN/${pkgver}/${_installer}")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.bin) from dr-download.ti.com, which is Texas Instruments' official software distribution domain (used for CCS, compilers, and other TI tools). The domain is legitimate TI infrastructure, not a personal or unofficial host. However, the package executes this binary installer directly (chmod +x then runs it with --mode unattended), which is a genuine supply-chain concern: if TI's download server were compromised or the URL were redirected, an arbitrary binary would execute with package build privileges. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the network level. The pattern of wrapping a vendor installer binary in a PKGBUILD is common in the AUR for proprietary tools (e.g., various TI, Xilinx, Intel packages) and is not inherently malicious. The medium rating is appropriate: it's an executed binary from a vendor host with a checksum, which is the standard AUR pattern for proprietary toolchain packages, but the execution of an opaque binary installer remains a real (if accepted) supply-chain risk class.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Phillip S. Kajubi <pintert3 at kalabentate dot com>
# Contributor: Alexei Colin <ac at alexeicolin dot com>
pkgname=ti-cgt-arm-clang
_partpkgver=4.0.3
pkgver=${_partpkgver}.LTS
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Texas Instruments Code Generation Tools (compiler) for ARM (CLANG) LTS"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.ti.com/tool/ARM-CGT"
license=('LicenseRef-multiple-licenses')
depends=('gcc-libs' 'nodejs')
conflicts=('ccstudio') # current package ships with the toolchains
_installer="ti_cgt_armllvm_${pkgver}_linux-x64_installer.bin"
source=("https://dr-download.ti.com/software-development/ide-configuration-compiler-or-debugger/MD-ayxs93eZNN/${pkgver}/${_installer}")
sha256sums=('617b0379a0f0aaac364d6b16f0ea899687ebf7f773a840d1c7d6f0691205919c')
options=(!strip libtool staticlibs emptydirs !purge !zipman)
# I intend to separate it from ccstudio
# _ccsdir=opt/ccstudio
# _installdir=ccs/tools/compiler
_tidir=opt/ti
_installdir=tools/compiler
prepare() {
cd $srcdir
chmod +x ./${_installer}
}
package() {
echo ">>> Running installer..."
./${_installer} --mode unattended --prefix $pkgdir/${_tidir}/${_installdir}
# Match permissions to ccstudio package (see notes in ccstudio.install)
find $pkgdir/${_tidir} -type d -exec chmod 0775 {} \;
install -D -m0644 $pkgdir/${_tidir}/${_installdir}/ti-cgt-armllvm_${pkgver}/TI_Arm_Clang_Compiler_${_partpkgver}_manifest.html $pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE.html
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |