timecamp-bin

maintainer cold911 · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com, which is an S3 bucket controlled by the TimeCamp vendor (not a personal or unofficial host). The URL pattern matches the official TimeCamp desktop app distribution. However, there are legitimate concerns: (1) S3 buckets can be misconfigured or taken over; (2) the LICENSE.html file is sourced locally with no URL, meaning it's a local file that must exist at build time — this is unusual and slightly suspicious but not malicious; (3) there is no GPG signature verification, only sha256sums. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific binary version. The binary is executed on the user's system. This is a standard 'binary package from vendor' pattern common in AUR (like -bin packages for many commercial apps), and the host appears to be the official vendor S3 bucket. The risk is real but typical for binary AUR packages — if the S3 bucket were compromised or the URL content changed, the sha256sum would catch it for this specific version. Overall this is a medium-risk pattern (prebuilt binary, no GPG verification) but consistent with legitimate vendor binary packaging rather than a supply-chain attack.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 "timecamp-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com/downloadsoft/${pkgver}/TimeCampSetup_LinAmd64.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com, which is an S3 bucket controlled by the TimeCamp vendor (not a personal or unofficial host). The URL pattern matches the official TimeCamp desktop app distribution. However, there are legitimate concerns: (1) S3 buckets can be misconfigured or taken over; (2) the LICENSE.html file is sourced locally with no URL, meaning it's a local file that must exist at build time — this is unusual and slightly suspicious but not malicious; (3) there is no GPG signature verification, only sha256sums. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific binary version. The binary is executed on the user's system. This is a standard 'binary package from vendor' pattern common in AUR (like -bin packages for many commercial apps), and the host appears to be the official vendor S3 bucket. The risk is real but typical for binary AUR packages — if the S3 bucket were compromised or the URL content changed, the sha256sum would catch it for this specific version. Overall this is a medium-risk pattern (prebuilt binary, no GPG verification) but consistent with legitimate vendor binary packaging rather than a supply-chain attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Maarten de Boer <maarten@cloudstek.nl>
2# Contributor: Shining Xu <skyfiretime@gmail.com>
3
4pkgname=timecamp-bin
5pkgver=1.7.2.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='Client application for TimeCamp software (Binary).'
8arch=('x86_64')
9url='https://www.timecamp.com/en/desktop-app'
10license=('custom')
11depends=('libappindicator-gtk2' 'libnotify' 'libxss' 'libsm')
12makedepends=()
13provides=('timecamp')
14options=()
15
16source=(
17 "timecamp-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com/downloadsoft/${pkgver}/TimeCampSetup_LinAmd64.tar.gz"
18 'LICENSE.html'
19)
20
21sha256sums=('0429a006ff65d421d3041c5806e514971a95cefa554e5916337a30cc92e70650'
22 '47c5c4cefd061e1f4f2d2fbeaf49b3c13954dce3582e35e6eda732d2e55287fa')
23
24prepare() {
25 ar x timecamp.deb
26}
27
28package() {
29 tar xzf data.tar.gz -C "$pkgdir"
30
31 # Install license
32 install -Dm 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/timecamp" LICENSE.html
33
34 # Move binary to /usr/bin
35 install -Dm 755 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/timecamp/timecamp"
36 rm -f "${pkgdir}/usr/share/timecamp/timecamp"
37 sed -i 's|Exec=/usr/share/timecamp/timecamp|Exec=/usr/bin/timecamp|' "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/timecamp.desktop"
38
39 # Install icons
40 for icon_size in 1024 512 256 128 96 64 48 32 24 16; do
41 icon_dir="${icon_size}x${icon_size}"
42 install -Dm 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${icon_dir}/apps" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/timecamp/icons/hicolor/${icon_dir}/apps/timecamp.png"
43 done
44
45 # Set correct icon
46 sed -i 's|Icon=/usr/share/timecamp/icons/tc.png|Icon=timecamp|' "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/timecamp.desktop"
47
48 # Set working directory
49 echo "Path=/usr/share/timecamp" >> "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/timecamp.desktop"
50}
51

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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