timecamp-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com, which is an S3 bucket controlled by the TimeCamp vendor (not a personal or unofficial host). The URL pattern matches the official TimeCamp desktop app distribution. However, there are legitimate concerns: (1) S3 buckets can be misconfigured or taken over; (2) the LICENSE.html file is sourced locally with no URL, meaning it's a local file that must exist at build time — this is unusual and slightly suspicious but not malicious; (3) there is no GPG signature verification, only sha256sums. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific binary version. The binary is executed on the user's system. This is a standard 'binary package from vendor' pattern common in AUR (like -bin packages for many commercial apps), and the host appears to be the official vendor S3 bucket. The risk is real but typical for binary AUR packages — if the S3 bucket were compromised or the URL content changed, the sha256sum would catch it for this specific version. Overall this is a medium-risk pattern (prebuilt binary, no GPG verification) but consistent with legitimate vendor binary packaging rather than a supply-chain attack.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:17
"timecamp-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com/downloadsoft/${pkgver}/TimeCampSetup_LinAmd64.tar.gz"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com, which is an S3 bucket controlled by the TimeCamp vendor (not a personal or unofficial host). The URL pattern matches the official TimeCamp desktop app distribution. However, there are legitimate concerns: (1) S3 buckets can be misconfigured or taken over; (2) the LICENSE.html file is sourced locally with no URL, meaning it's a local file that must exist at build time — this is unusual and slightly suspicious but not malicious; (3) there is no GPG signature verification, only sha256sums. The sha256sum does provide integrity checking against the specific binary version. The binary is executed on the user's system. This is a standard 'binary package from vendor' pattern common in AUR (like -bin packages for many commercial apps), and the host appears to be the official vendor S3 bucket. The risk is real but typical for binary AUR packages — if the S3 bucket were compromised or the URL content changed, the sha256sum would catch it for this specific version. Overall this is a medium-risk pattern (prebuilt binary, no GPG verification) but consistent with legitimate vendor binary packaging rather than a supply-chain attack.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Maarten de Boer <maarten@cloudstek.nl>
# Contributor: Shining Xu <skyfiretime@gmail.com>
pkgname=timecamp-bin
pkgver=1.7.2.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Client application for TimeCamp software (Binary).'
arch=('x86_64')
url='https://www.timecamp.com/en/desktop-app'
license=('custom')
depends=('libappindicator-gtk2' 'libnotify' 'libxss' 'libsm')
makedepends=()
provides=('timecamp')
options=()
source=(
"timecamp-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://timecamp.s3.amazonaws.com/downloadsoft/${pkgver}/TimeCampSetup_LinAmd64.tar.gz"
'LICENSE.html'
)
sha256sums=('0429a006ff65d421d3041c5806e514971a95cefa554e5916337a30cc92e70650'
'47c5c4cefd061e1f4f2d2fbeaf49b3c13954dce3582e35e6eda732d2e55287fa')
prepare() {
ar x timecamp.deb
}
package() {
tar xzf data.tar.gz -C "$pkgdir"
# Install license
install -Dm 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/timecamp" LICENSE.html
# Move binary to /usr/bin
install -Dm 755 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/timecamp/timecamp"
rm -f "${pkgdir}/usr/share/timecamp/timecamp"
sed -i 's|Exec=/usr/share/timecamp/timecamp|Exec=/usr/bin/timecamp|' "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/timecamp.desktop"
# Install icons
for icon_size in 1024 512 256 128 96 64 48 32 24 16; do
icon_dir="${icon_size}x${icon_size}"
install -Dm 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${icon_dir}/apps" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/timecamp/icons/hicolor/${icon_dir}/apps/timecamp.png"
done
# Set correct icon
sed -i 's|Icon=/usr/share/timecamp/icons/tc.png|Icon=timecamp|' "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/timecamp.desktop"
# Set working directory
echo "Path=/usr/share/timecamp" >> "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/timecamp.desktop"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |