ting-en

maintainer sukanka · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb from static.frdic.com, which is the CDN/static host for frdic.com (Eudic/Eusoft), a legitimate Chinese software company that makes the Eudic dictionary and Ting listening apps. This is effectively the vendor's own distribution host, not a random personal server. The sha512sum is present and pins the specific binary. The package extracts the .deb, pulls out the ASAR archive, and runs it under the system electron11, which is a reasonable and common AUR pattern for repackaging Electron apps from vendor .deb files. The main concern is that static.frdic.com is not a well-known official mirror and the binary is unverifiable beyond the hash, but this is standard practice for proprietary Chinese software repackaged in AUR. The risk is real but typical for this class of package — a medium rating is appropriate rather than clean, since the executable payload comes from a proprietary vendor CDN with no source code available for audit.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://static.frdic.com/pkg/ting_${_lang}/ting_${_lang}.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb from static.frdic.com, which is the CDN/static host for frdic.com (Eudic/Eusoft), a legitimate Chinese software company that makes the Eudic dictionary and Ting listening apps. This is effectively the vendor's own distribution host, not a random personal server. The sha512sum is present and pins the specific binary. The package extracts the .deb, pulls out the ASAR archive, and runs it under the system electron11, which is a reasonable and common AUR pattern for repackaging Electron apps from vendor .deb files. The main concern is that static.frdic.com is not a well-known official mirror and the binary is unverifiable beyond the hash, but this is standard practice for proprietary Chinese software repackaged in AUR. The risk is real but typical for this class of package — a medium rating is appropriate rather than clean, since the executable payload comes from a proprietary vendor CDN with no source code available for audit.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: sukanka <su975853527 at gmail dot com>
2
3_lang=en
4pkgname=ting-${_lang}
5pkgver=9.7.4
6pkgrel=1
7_llang=English
8pkgdesc="Daily ${_llang} Listening software from eusoft"
9arch=('x86_64')
10url="https://www.eudic.net/v4/${_lang}/app/ting"
11license=('unknown')
12_electron=electron11
13depends=("${_electron}")
14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://static.frdic.com/pkg/ting_${_lang}/ting_${_lang}.deb")
15sha512sums=('233940fe7c2f73f260c5d6a61478fea9b16d93f5cfd9518e0db7b25655c11bf30c0fc8d5567bb0c57d3c07770c20aa678f3538c169e318ab31d9e2e008fbc528')
16
17prepare() {
18 cd $srcdir
19 mkdir -p build
20 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C build/
21 cd build
22 dir_name=$(ls opt/)
23 mv opt/${dir_name}/resources/app.asar ${pkgname}.asar
24}
25
26package() {
27 cd $srcdir/build
28
29 mv usr/ ${pkgdir}/usr
30 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/share/eusoft/${pkgname}
31 mv ${pkgname}.asar ${pkgdir}/usr/share/eusoft/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.asar
32 sed -i "s|^Exec.*|Exec=${pkgname} %U|" ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/ting_${_lang}.desktop
33
34 # link executable
35 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
36 echo """#!/usr/bin/bash
37exec ${_electron} /usr/share/eusoft/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.asar --disable-gpu-sandbox "\$@"
38""" >${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
39 chmod a+x ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
40
41}
42# vim: ts=2 sw=2 et:
43

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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