ting-es

maintainer sukanka · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from static.frdic.com, which is the CDN/static asset host used by Eudic/Eusoft (the vendor behind the eudic dictionary and ting apps). This is not an unofficial personal host — frdic.com is the vendor's own domain (Eudic's Chinese brand site). The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk. However, the source URL is unversioned ('ting_es.deb' with no version in the filename), meaning the checksum could drift if the vendor updates the file in place, and there is no GPG signature verification. The binary is an Electron app extracted from a .deb and executed directly. This is a real medium-risk pattern (prebuilt proprietary binary from a vendor CDN, no signature, unversioned URL) but not a high-severity supply-chain attack — it is consistent with standard AUR packaging of proprietary Linux apps distributed as .deb files.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://static.frdic.com/pkg/ting_${_lang}/ting_${_lang}.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from static.frdic.com, which is the CDN/static asset host used by Eudic/Eusoft (the vendor behind the eudic dictionary and ting apps). This is not an unofficial personal host — frdic.com is the vendor's own domain (Eudic's Chinese brand site). The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates silent substitution risk. However, the source URL is unversioned ('ting_es.deb' with no version in the filename), meaning the checksum could drift if the vendor updates the file in place, and there is no GPG signature verification. The binary is an Electron app extracted from a .deb and executed directly. This is a real medium-risk pattern (prebuilt proprietary binary from a vendor CDN, no signature, unversioned URL) but not a high-severity supply-chain attack — it is consistent with standard AUR packaging of proprietary Linux apps distributed as .deb files.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: sukanka <su975853527 at gmail dot com>
2
3_lang=es
4pkgname=ting-${_lang}
5pkgver=9.7.4
6pkgrel=1
7_llang=Spanish
8pkgdesc="Daily ${_llang} Listening software from eusoft"
9arch=('x86_64')
10url="https://www.eudic.net/v4/${_lang}/app/ting"
11license=('unknown')
12_electron=electron11
13depends=("${_electron}")
14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://static.frdic.com/pkg/ting_${_lang}/ting_${_lang}.deb")
15sha512sums=('820baec73bc6df379b544f52a40cfe6870fd9013248ddc766426ab441e44fe5834cb1451ff1d658a52240e3a22cfa3059b2946981d5f105b5140e67147f816a8')
16
17# sometime use curl to download source deb, throws 404 not found.
18# user other UA instead of origion one fixed it.
19# https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Nonfree_applications_package_guidelines#Custom_DLAGENT
20DLAGENTS=("https::/usr/bin/curl -A 'Mozilla' -fLC - --retry 3 --retry-delay 3 -o %o %u")
21
22prepare() {
23 cd $srcdir
24 mkdir -p build
25 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C build/
26 cd build
27 dir_name=$(ls opt/)
28 mv opt/${dir_name}/resources/app.asar ${pkgname}.asar
29}
30
31package() {
32 cd $srcdir/build
33
34 mv usr/ ${pkgdir}/usr
35 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/share/eusoft/${pkgname}
36 mv ${pkgname}.asar ${pkgdir}/usr/share/eusoft/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.asar
37 sed -i "s|^Exec.*|Exec=${pkgname} %U|" ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/ting_${_lang}.desktop
38
39 # link executable
40 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
41 echo """#!/usr/bin/bash
42exec ${_electron} /usr/share/eusoft/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.asar --disable-gpu-sandbox "\$@"
43""" >${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
44 chmod a+x ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
45
46}
47# vim: ts=2 sw=2 et:
48

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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