tmpview-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer Auerhuhn 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary (tmpview) downloaded directly from style64.org, which is the upstream vendor's own website for this niche C64/assembly tool. The URL matches the package's declared upstream URL, so this is not a third-party or personal host — it is the official release host for this software. However, the binary is proprietary, pre-compiled, and not built from source, meaning users must trust the vendor's binary entirely. The sha512sum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against a compromised upstream host serving a malicious binary. This is a classic 'binary blob from upstream vendor' scenario: legitimate but inherently carries supply-chain risk since no source build is possible. The cheaper model's concern about a 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since style64.org is the actual upstream, but the risk of executing an unauditable proprietary binary is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://style64.org/file/${_upstream_pkgname}.zip")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary (tmpview) downloaded directly from style64.org, which is the upstream vendor's own website for this niche C64/assembly tool. The URL matches the package's declared upstream URL, so this is not a third-party or personal host — it is the official release host for this software. However, the binary is proprietary, pre-compiled, and not built from source, meaning users must trust the vendor's binary entirely. The sha512sum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against a compromised upstream host serving a malicious binary. This is a classic 'binary blob from upstream vendor' scenario: legitimate but inherently carries supply-chain risk since no source build is possible. The cheaper model's concern about a 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since style64.org is the actual upstream, but the risk of executing an unauditable proprietary binary is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Claudia Pellegrino <aur ät cpellegrino.de>
2
3pkgname=tmpview-bin
4pkgver=1.3.1
5pkgrel=2
6_upstream_pkgname="TMPview_v${pkgver}-STYLE"
7pkgdesc='Viewer/converter between Turbo Macro Pro and plain text (TMPx) assembly formats'
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://style64.org/release/tmpview-v${pkgver}-style"
10license=('custom:proprietary')
11depends=('gcc-libs')
12options=('!strip') # released binary is already stripped
13
14source=("https://style64.org/file/${_upstream_pkgname}.zip")
15
16sha512sums=(
17 'db122a952f3c94631cd186d1a791d0aae2746946a4ff36e2bc0936eb3bdf91eea267ed5f16146c498c307b8e8eb46ca0c640bef14b575d59874aeb035c9815fd'
18)
19
20build() {
21 echo >&2 'Adding license information'
22 # Derived from the output of `tmpview --help`
23 echo > "${srcdir}/LICENSE" '(c) Style 2006-2015'
24
25 echo >&2 'Converting documentation to UTF-8'
26 mkdir -p "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/build"
27 iconv -f cp437 -t utf-8 \
28 -o "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/build/STYLE.nfo" \
29 "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/STYLE.nfo"
30}
31
32package() {
33 echo >&2 'Packaging executable'
34 install -D -m 755 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin" \
35 "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/linux-${CARCH}/tmpview"
36
37 echo >&2 'Packaging documentation'
38 install -D -m 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}" \
39 "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/changelog.txt" \
40 "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/build/STYLE.nfo" \
41 "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/linux-${CARCH}/readme.txt" \
42
43 echo >&2 'Packaging the example'
44 install -D -m 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/example" \
45 "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/test-jmorph.src.prg"
46
47 echo >&2 'Packaging the license'
48 install -D -m 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}" \
49 "${srcdir}/LICENSE"
50}
51

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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