tmpview-bin
The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary (tmpview) downloaded directly from style64.org, which is the upstream vendor's own website for this niche C64/assembly tool. The URL matches the package's declared upstream URL, so this is not a third-party or personal host — it is the official release host for this software. However, the binary is proprietary, pre-compiled, and not built from source, meaning users must trust the vendor's binary entirely. The sha512sum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against a compromised upstream host serving a malicious binary. This is a classic 'binary blob from upstream vendor' scenario: legitimate but inherently carries supply-chain risk since no source build is possible. The cheaper model's concern about a 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since style64.org is the actual upstream, but the risk of executing an unauditable proprietary binary is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("https://style64.org/file/${_upstream_pkgname}.zip")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary (tmpview) downloaded directly from style64.org, which is the upstream vendor's own website for this niche C64/assembly tool. The URL matches the package's declared upstream URL, so this is not a third-party or personal host — it is the official release host for this software. However, the binary is proprietary, pre-compiled, and not built from source, meaning users must trust the vendor's binary entirely. The sha512sum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against a compromised upstream host serving a malicious binary. This is a classic 'binary blob from upstream vendor' scenario: legitimate but inherently carries supply-chain risk since no source build is possible. The cheaper model's concern about a 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since style64.org is the actual upstream, but the risk of executing an unauditable proprietary binary is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Claudia Pellegrino <aur ät cpellegrino.de>
pkgname=tmpview-bin
pkgver=1.3.1
pkgrel=2
_upstream_pkgname="TMPview_v${pkgver}-STYLE"
pkgdesc='Viewer/converter between Turbo Macro Pro and plain text (TMPx) assembly formats'
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://style64.org/release/tmpview-v${pkgver}-style"
license=('custom:proprietary')
depends=('gcc-libs')
options=('!strip') # released binary is already stripped
source=("https://style64.org/file/${_upstream_pkgname}.zip")
sha512sums=(
'db122a952f3c94631cd186d1a791d0aae2746946a4ff36e2bc0936eb3bdf91eea267ed5f16146c498c307b8e8eb46ca0c640bef14b575d59874aeb035c9815fd'
)
build() {
echo >&2 'Adding license information'
# Derived from the output of `tmpview --help`
echo > "${srcdir}/LICENSE" '(c) Style 2006-2015'
echo >&2 'Converting documentation to UTF-8'
mkdir -p "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/build"
iconv -f cp437 -t utf-8 \
-o "${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/build/STYLE.nfo" \
"${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/STYLE.nfo"
}
package() {
echo >&2 'Packaging executable'
install -D -m 755 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin" \
"${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/linux-${CARCH}/tmpview"
echo >&2 'Packaging documentation'
install -D -m 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}" \
"${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/changelog.txt" \
"${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/build/STYLE.nfo" \
"${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/linux-${CARCH}/readme.txt" \
echo >&2 'Packaging the example'
install -D -m 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/example" \
"${srcdir}/${_upstream_pkgname}/test-jmorph.src.prg"
echo >&2 'Packaging the license'
install -D -m 644 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}" \
"${srcdir}/LICENSE"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |