tomo-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from bruce-hill.com, which is the author's personal domain hosting the Tomo programming language. While the maintainer appears to be the upstream author (same email/domain), the source is still a personal/unofficial host rather than a well-known forge like GitHub releases. The binary is executed code (a compiler) installed directly into the system. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates accidental corruption but not a deliberate host compromise or key substitution. The double extraction pattern (tar inside package() on an already-extracted srcdir) is unusual but not malicious. The core concern is that a prebuilt binary from a personal domain with no reproducibility guarantee or GPG signature represents a genuine supply-chain risk: if bruce-hill.com is compromised, users would silently install a malicious compiler. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("https://tomo.bruce-hill.com/dist/tomo@${_tomo_version}_Linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 80%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from bruce-hill.com, which is the author's personal domain hosting the Tomo programming language. While the maintainer appears to be the upstream author (same email/domain), the source is still a personal/unofficial host rather than a well-known forge like GitHub releases. The binary is executed code (a compiler) installed directly into the system. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates accidental corruption but not a deliberate host compromise or key substitution. The double extraction pattern (tar inside package() on an already-extracted srcdir) is unusual but not malicious. The core concern is that a prebuilt binary from a personal domain with no reproducibility guarantee or GPG signature represents a genuine supply-chain risk: if bruce-hill.com is compromised, users would silently install a malicious compiler. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# SPDX-FileContributor: Bruce Hill <contact@bruce-hill.com>
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 Bruce Hill
# SPDX-License-Identifier: 0BSD
# Maintainer: Bruce Hill <contact@bruce-hill.com>
pkgname=tomo-bin
_tomo_version=2026-03-14
pkgver="${_tomo_version//-/_}"
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='The Tomo programming language compiler'
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://tomo.bruce-hill.com"
license=('custom')
depends=('gcc' 'binutils' 'gmp' 'libunistring' 'gc')
source=("https://tomo.bruce-hill.com/dist/tomo@${_tomo_version}_Linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")
sha256sums=('e6389315da8342583666c8968b3407fa8915edfb44641ea7ead057ee20a40d9b')
package() {
cd "$srcdir"
mkdir "$pkgdir/usr"
tar -xzf "tomo@${_tomo_version}_Linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz" -C "$pkgdir/usr" --strip-components=1
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |