tomo-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer bruce-hill 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from bruce-hill.com, which is the author's personal domain hosting the Tomo programming language. While the maintainer appears to be the upstream author (same email/domain), the source is still a personal/unofficial host rather than a well-known forge like GitHub releases. The binary is executed code (a compiler) installed directly into the system. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates accidental corruption but not a deliberate host compromise or key substitution. The double extraction pattern (tar inside package() on an already-extracted srcdir) is unusual but not malicious. The core concern is that a prebuilt binary from a personal domain with no reproducibility guarantee or GPG signature represents a genuine supply-chain risk: if bruce-hill.com is compromised, users would silently install a malicious compiler. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://tomo.bruce-hill.com/dist/tomo@${_tomo_version}_Linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 80%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from bruce-hill.com, which is the author's personal domain hosting the Tomo programming language. While the maintainer appears to be the upstream author (same email/domain), the source is still a personal/unofficial host rather than a well-known forge like GitHub releases. The binary is executed code (a compiler) installed directly into the system. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates accidental corruption but not a deliberate host compromise or key substitution. The double extraction pattern (tar inside package() on an already-extracted srcdir) is unusual but not malicious. The core concern is that a prebuilt binary from a personal domain with no reproducibility guarantee or GPG signature represents a genuine supply-chain risk: if bruce-hill.com is compromised, users would silently install a malicious compiler. This is a textbook medium-severity AUR concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# SPDX-FileContributor: Bruce Hill <contact@bruce-hill.com>
2# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 Bruce Hill
3# SPDX-License-Identifier: 0BSD
4# Maintainer: Bruce Hill <contact@bruce-hill.com>
5pkgname=tomo-bin
6_tomo_version=2026-03-14
7pkgver="${_tomo_version//-/_}"
8pkgrel=1
9pkgdesc='The Tomo programming language compiler'
10arch=('x86_64')
11url="https://tomo.bruce-hill.com"
12license=('custom')
13depends=('gcc' 'binutils' 'gmp' 'libunistring' 'gc')
14source=("https://tomo.bruce-hill.com/dist/tomo@${_tomo_version}_Linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz")
15sha256sums=('e6389315da8342583666c8968b3407fa8915edfb44641ea7ead057ee20a40d9b')
16package() {
17 cd "$srcdir"
18 mkdir "$pkgdir/usr"
19 tar -xzf "tomo@${_tomo_version}_Linux-${CARCH}.tar.gz" -C "$pkgdir/usr" --strip-components=1
20}
21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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