tonelib-zoom-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from tonelib.net (the vendor's own website) and installs its contents directly. This is the official vendor site for ToneLib products, so it is not a random personal host. However, the source URL is not versioned/pinned — it points to a floating 'latest' URL (ToneLib-Zoom-amd64.deb with no version in the filename), meaning the sha256sum provides integrity only at the time of packaging; any future update to that URL would break the checksum rather than silently deliver malicious code. The real concern is that a prebuilt closed-source binary is being extracted and installed system-wide, and the source is a proprietary vendor's download server rather than a reproducible build. This is a legitimate medium supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-distro host with a floating URL), but not an active attack. The sha256sum does provide some protection against interception at the pinned version.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("https://www.tonelib.net/download/ToneLib-Zoom-amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from tonelib.net (the vendor's own website) and installs its contents directly. This is the official vendor site for ToneLib products, so it is not a random personal host. However, the source URL is not versioned/pinned — it points to a floating 'latest' URL (ToneLib-Zoom-amd64.deb with no version in the filename), meaning the sha256sum provides integrity only at the time of packaging; any future update to that URL would break the checksum rather than silently deliver malicious code. The real concern is that a prebuilt closed-source binary is being extracted and installed system-wide, and the source is a proprietary vendor's download server rather than a reproducible build. This is a legitimate medium supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-distro host with a floating URL), but not an active attack. The sha256sum does provide some protection against interception at the pinned version.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: olivierlm < mail at olivierlemoal dot fr >
pkgname=tonelib-zoom-bin
pkgver=4.3.1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="ToneLib Zoom – change and save all the settings in your Zoom(r) guitar pedal"
arch=('x86_64')
license=('custom')
url="https://tonelib.net/zoom-quick-start/"
depends=('webkit2gtk')
optdepends=('jack: JACK output')
source=("https://www.tonelib.net/download/ToneLib-Zoom-amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('e2adaf334feaee8fc5ada7273b6c719ebdbba29a9f550a0dedfb2a4c3f53aff7')
package () {
tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/tonelib-zoom/copyright" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
}
post_install() {
gtk-update-icon-cache -q -t -f usr/share/icons/hicolor
update-desktop-database -q
}
post_remove() {
gtk-update-icon-cache -q -t -f usr/share/icons/hicolor
update-desktop-database -q
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |