toolkit

maintainer Connor · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) from software.concise.cc, which is a personal/unofficial host controlled by the maintainer. The package installs executables directly from this binary tarball via 'install -Dm755 usr/bin/*'. While there is a sha512sum and a PGP key listed (validpgpkeys), the trust anchor is entirely the maintainer's own infrastructure and signing key — there is no upstream vendor release host or official mirror involved. If the host or key is compromised, arbitrary binaries would be installed. This is a textbook supply-chain risk: executed binaries from a personal host with self-signed verification. The sha512sum provides some integrity guarantee but not authenticity beyond trusting the same party who controls the host. This warrants a MEDIUM rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) from software.concise.cc, which is a personal/unofficial host controlled by the maintainer. The package installs executables directly from this binary tarball via 'install -Dm755 usr/bin/*'. While there is a sha512sum and a PGP key listed (validpgpkeys), the trust anchor is entirely the maintainer's own infrastructure and signing key — there is no upstream vendor release host or official mirror involved. If the host or key is compromised, arbitrary binaries would be installed. This is a textbook supply-chain risk: executed binaries from a personal host with self-signed verification. The sha512sum provides some integrity guarantee but not authenticity beyond trusting the same party who controls the host. This warrants a MEDIUM rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
2# ---
3pkgname=toolkit
4pkgver=0.1.1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A toolbox for the CLI, rapidly speeding up file editing and data management processes."
7arch=(any)
8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
9license=('MIT')
10depends=(bat ruby)
11optdepends=('nvim: the recommended editor for power users')
12conflicts=(qed)
13source=(
14 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
15)
16sha512sums=(
17 '0303a2ba47a3926c3ec2d928948fe10eaf27bfddd7402a31a291780a8124853ad1bfcf28ccde8be4543ddc46615fa59db67436324c7784ac4cdba9eecdc8da5f'
18)
19md5sums=(
20 '5b35607a0a9fcb153f61f182059b8a04'
21)
22validpgpkeys=(
23 '81BACEEBC3EA26E127166E4A819BB92A9A48160E'
24)
25
26package() {
27
28 cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-${arch}" ||
29 cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}"
30
31 install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
32 install -Dm755 usr/bin/* -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
33}
34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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