torguard

maintainer ABOhiccups · 18 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from updates.torguard.biz, which is TorGuard's own official update infrastructure (not a personal or third-party host). The package installs a closed-source VPN client binary directly into /opt/torguard and symlinks its wrapper into /usr/bin. While the host is the vendor's own update server (a legitimate pattern for proprietary software distributed via AUR), the artifact is a prebuilt executable blob with no source build, and the sha256sum is a single fixed checksum providing only integrity, not authenticity. If the vendor's update server were compromised or the artifact silently replaced with a matching checksum collision, arbitrary code would execute with user/root privileges. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary binary AUR packages: not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern due to the executed binary from an external host with no GPG signature verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=("https://updates.torguard.biz/Software/Linux/torguard-v${pkgver}-amd64-arch.tar.gz")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from updates.torguard.biz, which is TorGuard's own official update infrastructure (not a personal or third-party host). The package installs a closed-source VPN client binary directly into /opt/torguard and symlinks its wrapper into /usr/bin. While the host is the vendor's own update server (a legitimate pattern for proprietary software distributed via AUR), the artifact is a prebuilt executable blob with no source build, and the sha256sum is a single fixed checksum providing only integrity, not authenticity. If the vendor's update server were compromised or the artifact silently replaced with a matching checksum collision, arbitrary code would execute with user/root privileges. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary binary AUR packages: not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern due to the executed binary from an external host with no GPG signature verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: ABOhiccups <info@abohiccups.com>
2# Contributor: Arch Linux Community
3# Contributor: TorGuard Support <support@torguard.com>
4pkgname=torguard
5pkgver=4.8.29
6build=build.286.1+g70e4e51
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="TorGuard VPN Software
9 Stay private online with TorGuard's anonymous VPN software and connect to 37+ countries worldwide."
10arch=('x86_64')
11url="https://www.torguard.net"
12depends=('iproute2' 'psmisc' 'libxkbcommon-x11')
13optdepends=('wireguard-tools: wireguard support')
14license=(custom)
15source=("https://updates.torguard.biz/Software/Linux/torguard-v${pkgver}-amd64-arch.tar.gz")
16sha256sums=('1a828c7d13de59f9db34489ba5407bf2201181280aa6c6af1e4241982b0d1925')
17install=torguard.install
18
19package() {
20 bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/torguard-v${pkgver}-${build}-amd64-arch/torguard-v${pkgver}-${build}-amd64-arch.tar" -C "$pkgdir" -s"/torguard-v${pkgver}-${build}-amd64-arch//"
21
22 install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/
23 ln -s /opt/torguard/bin/torguard-wrapper "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/torguard
24}
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion