track
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (track.zip containing a 'track' executable) directly from an S3 bucket (s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/track-cli/) and installs it as an executable at /usr/bin/track. While the sha256sum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, the fundamental concern is that this is a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled S3 bucket rather than source code compiled locally. The S3 bucket is plausibly the official vendor distribution channel for 'tracks.run', but it is not a standard package repository or well-known ecosystem mirror. There is no source code, no build step, and no way to audit what the binary does. This is a classic supply-chain risk: if the S3 object is replaced (the bucket owner or an attacker with bucket access could swap the binary while keeping the same URL), users would install a malicious executable. The sha256sum would catch this only if the PKGBUILD is also updated, but AUR users typically trust the PKGBUILD as-is. This pattern — prebuilt binary from a non-standard host installed as a system executable — warrants a MEDIUM rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=('https://s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/track-cli/downloads/linux_x86_64/track.zip')
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (track.zip containing a 'track' executable) directly from an S3 bucket (s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/track-cli/) and installs it as an executable at /usr/bin/track. While the sha256sum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, the fundamental concern is that this is a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled S3 bucket rather than source code compiled locally. The S3 bucket is plausibly the official vendor distribution channel for 'tracks.run', but it is not a standard package repository or well-known ecosystem mirror. There is no source code, no build step, and no way to audit what the binary does. This is a classic supply-chain risk: if the S3 object is replaced (the bucket owner or an attacker with bucket access could swap the binary while keeping the same URL), users would install a malicious executable. The sha256sum would catch this only if the PKGBUILD is also updated, but AUR users typically trust the PKGBUILD as-is. This pattern — prebuilt binary from a non-standard host installed as a system executable — warrants a MEDIUM rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Kai Yamada <gpioblink@gmail.com>
pkgname=track
pkgver=1.0.6
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='track CLI: Allow local IDE usage during the exam on track'
arch=('any')
url='https://tracks.run/'
license=('custom')
source=('https://s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/track-cli/downloads/linux_x86_64/track.zip')
sha256sums=('c861c02cf61bc86bb0d0646775be6280fbf69c57c2f35a234d82383f4698f33e')
package() {
cd ${srcdir}
install -Dm755 track "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/track"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |