track

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

• PKGBUILD:11 source=('https://s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/track-cli/downloads/linux_x86_64/track.zip')

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (track.zip containing a 'track' executable) directly from an S3 bucket (s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/track-cli/) and installs it as an executable at /usr/bin/track. While the sha256sum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, the fundamental concern is that this is a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled S3 bucket rather than source code compiled locally. The S3 bucket is plausibly the official vendor distribution channel for 'tracks.run', but it is not a standard package repository or well-known ecosystem mirror. There is no source code, no build step, and no way to audit what the binary does. This is a classic supply-chain risk: if the S3 object is replaced (the bucket owner or an attacker with bucket access could swap the binary while keeping the same URL), users would install a malicious executable. The sha256sum would catch this only if the PKGBUILD is also updated, but AUR users typically trust the PKGBUILD as-is. This pattern — prebuilt binary from a non-standard host installed as a system executable — warrants a MEDIUM rating.