trustbuilder-appimage

maintainer nomorsad · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.trustbuilder.com, which is the vendor's own download subdomain (trustbuilder.com is the official product website listed in the url= field). The binary is extracted and executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract, and the AppImage itself is installed and symlinked as the user-facing executable. A sha256sum is provided, which pins the specific artifact. The concern is that this is a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor download host rather than a source build or an official distro mirror — if the host were compromised or the vendor pushed a silent update, the checksum would catch it only for the pinned version. The license field claims GPL but this is a proprietary authenticator product, which is suspicious but not necessarily malicious. Overall this fits the classic AUR AppImage pattern: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a vendor host, no source build) but not an active attack, so MEDIUM is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:16 source=("${_appimage}::https://download.trustbuilder.com/wp-content/uploads/${_appimage}")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.trustbuilder.com, which is the vendor's own download subdomain (trustbuilder.com is the official product website listed in the url= field). The binary is extracted and executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract, and the AppImage itself is installed and symlinked as the user-facing executable. A sha256sum is provided, which pins the specific artifact. The concern is that this is a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor download host rather than a source build or an official distro mirror — if the host were compromised or the vendor pushed a silent update, the checksum would catch it only for the pinned version. The license field claims GPL but this is a proprietary authenticator product, which is suspicious but not necessarily malicious. Overall this fits the classic AUR AppImage pattern: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a vendor host, no source build) but not an active attack, so MEDIUM is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Vincent Bauchart <vincent.bauchart at tutanota dot com>
    
      2_pkgname=trustbuilder
    
      3pkgname=trustbuilder-appimage
    
      4pkgver=6.38.0.5319
    
      5pkgrel=2
    
      6pkgdesc='Trustbuilder Authenticator / AppImage version'
    
      7arch=(x86_64)
    
      8url=https://www.trustbuilder.com/
    
      9license=(GPL)
    
      10_appimage="Authenticator6-Linux.AppImage"
    
      11noextract=("${_appimage}")
    
      12provides=('trustbuilder')
    
      13depends=('fuse2')
    
      14conflicts=('trustbuilder')
    
      15options=(!strip !debug)
    
      16source=("${_appimage}::https://download.trustbuilder.com/wp-content/uploads/${_appimage}")
    
      17sha256sums=('e05796e8ddcf072afca303eb022931510b59dde9ae6e64e812cbad8ccc584c73')
    
      18appname="trustbuilder"
    
      19
    
      20prepare() {
    
      21    chmod +x "${_appimage}"
    
      22    ./"${_appimage}" --appimage-extract
    
      23}
    
      24
    
      25build() {
    
      26    # Adjust .desktop so it will work outside of AppImage container
    
      27    sed -i -E "s|Exec=.*|Exec=/usr/bin/${appname} %U|"\
    
      28        "squashfs-root/authenticator 6.desktop"
    
      29
    
      30    # We need to match the WMClass of the AppImage which is different from the provided desktop file
    
      31    sed -i -E "s|StartupWMClass=.*|StartupWMClass=Authenticator 6|"\
    
      32        "squashfs-root/authenticator 6.desktop"
    
      33
    
      34    # Fix permissions; .AppImage permissions are 700 for all directories
    
      35    chmod -R a-x+rX squashfs-root/usr
    
      36}
    
      37
    
      38package() {
    
      39    # AppImage
    
      40    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${_appimage}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
    
      41
    
      42    # Desktop file
    
      43    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/authenticator 6.desktop"\
    
      44            "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${appname}.desktop"
    
      45
    
      46    # Icon image
    
      47    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/"
    
      48    cp -a "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/0x0/apps/authenticator 6.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
    
      49
    
      50    # Symlink executable
    
      51    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      52    ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${appname}"
    
      53}
    
      54
    
      55pkgver() {
    
      56    grep "X-AppImage-Version" "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/authenticator 6.desktop" | sed 's/.*=\(.*\)/\1/'
    
      57}
    
      58

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2