tumelune-bin
The package downloads and installs a prebuilt binary from a personal/project host (fedi.doom.solutions) rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official vendor CDN, etc.). The binary is executed directly as /usr/bin/tumelune. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity against accidental corruption or CDN substitution), they do not protect against the host owner replacing the binary with a malicious one and updating the PKGBUILD simultaneously. The host appears to be the maintainer's own server hosting a personal project, which is a legitimate but non-standard pattern. This is a real supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, users get arbitrary code execution. This fits the medium category — not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from an unofficial personal host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("https://fedi.doom.solutions/tumelune/files/tumelune-v${pkgver}-linux-x64.bin" tumelune.desktop tumelune.png )
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads and installs a prebuilt binary from a personal/project host (fedi.doom.solutions) rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official vendor CDN, etc.). The binary is executed directly as /usr/bin/tumelune. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity against accidental corruption or CDN substitution), they do not protect against the host owner replacing the binary with a malicious one and updating the PKGBUILD simultaneously. The host appears to be the maintainer's own server hosting a personal project, which is a legitimate but non-standard pattern. This is a real supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, users get arbitrary code execution. This fits the medium category — not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from an unofficial personal host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Hannaeko <tech+aur@hannaeko.eu>
pkgname=tumelune-bin
pkgver=0.17.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='a simple program to browse and search in twitter and mastodon archives'
arch=(x86_64)
license=(unknown)
url=https://fedi.doom.solutions/tumelune/
provides=(tumelune)
conflicts=(tumelune)
source=("https://fedi.doom.solutions/tumelune/files/tumelune-v${pkgver}-linux-x64.bin" tumelune.desktop tumelune.png )
sha256sums=('09d4d6ca6541322354edeb0503e89a935a9e57f2e9f7d0d1d91f1e6ea9359145'
'e444a2095820b3ca1105a78ffff81bfc1d51cda2fd85a9fbcaf7d4427fc37515'
'0ff4d4976cb12e860826ea4b037348bbab6401bcee169ae698d32c48b0e13ee2')
package() {
install -Dm755 tumelune-v${pkgver}-linux-x64.bin "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/tumelune"
install -Dm644 tumelune.desktop "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/tumelune.desktop"
install -Dm644 tumelune.png "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/tumelune.png"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |