tumelune-bin

maintainer hannaeko · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads and installs a prebuilt binary from a personal/project host (fedi.doom.solutions) rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official vendor CDN, etc.). The binary is executed directly as /usr/bin/tumelune. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity against accidental corruption or CDN substitution), they do not protect against the host owner replacing the binary with a malicious one and updating the PKGBUILD simultaneously. The host appears to be the maintainer's own server hosting a personal project, which is a legitimate but non-standard pattern. This is a real supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, users get arbitrary code execution. This fits the medium category — not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from an unofficial personal host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("https://fedi.doom.solutions/tumelune/files/tumelune-v${pkgver}-linux-x64.bin" tumelune.desktop tumelune.png )
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads and installs a prebuilt binary from a personal/project host (fedi.doom.solutions) rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official vendor CDN, etc.). The binary is executed directly as /usr/bin/tumelune. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity against accidental corruption or CDN substitution), they do not protect against the host owner replacing the binary with a malicious one and updating the PKGBUILD simultaneously. The host appears to be the maintainer's own server hosting a personal project, which is a legitimate but non-standard pattern. This is a real supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer is malicious, users get arbitrary code execution. This fits the medium category — not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from an unofficial personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Hannaeko <tech+aur@hannaeko.eu>
2
3pkgname=tumelune-bin
4pkgver=0.17.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc='a simple program to browse and search in twitter and mastodon archives'
7arch=(x86_64)
8license=(unknown)
9url=https://fedi.doom.solutions/tumelune/
10provides=(tumelune)
11conflicts=(tumelune)
12source=("https://fedi.doom.solutions/tumelune/files/tumelune-v${pkgver}-linux-x64.bin" tumelune.desktop tumelune.png )
13sha256sums=('09d4d6ca6541322354edeb0503e89a935a9e57f2e9f7d0d1d91f1e6ea9359145'
14 'e444a2095820b3ca1105a78ffff81bfc1d51cda2fd85a9fbcaf7d4427fc37515'
15 '0ff4d4976cb12e860826ea4b037348bbab6401bcee169ae698d32c48b0e13ee2')
16
17package() {
18 install -Dm755 tumelune-v${pkgver}-linux-x64.bin "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/tumelune"
19 install -Dm644 tumelune.desktop "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/tumelune.desktop"
20 install -Dm644 tumelune.png "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/tumelune.png"
21}
22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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