ukrainealarm-client-bin

maintainer sonmi-451 · 1 votes · base ukrainealarm-client · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from apt.ukrainealarm.com, which is the project's own official APT repository (matching the upstream URL ukrainealarm.com/linux-app). This is a common AUR pattern for -bin packages that repackage official vendor binaries. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification against accidental corruption or CDN tampering. However, the host is a project-specific domain with no independent verification mechanism (no GPG signature check, no Arch-official mirror), so if the upstream host were compromised or the maintainer's server were taken over, a malicious binary could be served with a matching hash only if the PKGBUILD's hash were also updated. The real concern is the executed binary from a non-standard host without GPG verification — this is the standard medium-risk pattern for -bin AUR packages from small/regional projects. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern warranting the medium rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:23 https://apt.ukrainealarm.com/pool/main/u/${pkgbase}/${pkgbase}_${_pkgver}_${_arch}.deb

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from apt.ukrainealarm.com, which is the project's own official APT repository (matching the upstream URL ukrainealarm.com/linux-app). This is a common AUR pattern for -bin packages that repackage official vendor binaries. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification against accidental corruption or CDN tampering. However, the host is a project-specific domain with no independent verification mechanism (no GPG signature check, no Arch-official mirror), so if the upstream host were compromised or the maintainer's server were taken over, a malicious binary could be served with a matching hash only if the PKGBUILD's hash were also updated. The real concern is the executed binary from a non-standard host without GPG verification — this is the standard medium-risk pattern for -bin AUR packages from small/regional projects. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern warranting the medium rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Yevhen Hurynovych <support@stfalcon.com>
    
      2# Contributor: Alexander Hrinchuk <agrynchuk@gmail.com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgbase='ukrainealarm-client'
    
      5pkgname="${pkgbase}-bin"
    
      6pkgver=0.2.0
    
      7pkgrel=0
    
      8pkgdesc="Linux client for receiving alarms in Ukraine (see https://www.ukrainealarm.com/). It's allows plays sounds like in Android app and execute custom script on alarms evenents."
    
      9arch=('x86_64')
    
      10install=ukrainealarm-client.install
    
      11_arch='amd64'
    
      12_pkgver="${pkgver}-0~bullseye0"
    
      13url="https://www.ukrainealarm.com/linux-app"
    
      14license=('custom')
    
      15depends=(
    
      16    'alsa-lib'
    
      17    'glibc'
    
      18)
    
      19optdepends=('libpulse: A featureful, general-purpose sound server.')
    
      20provides=(${pkgbase})
    
      21conflicts=(${pkgbase})
    
      22source=(
    
      23    https://apt.ukrainealarm.com/pool/main/u/${pkgbase}/${pkgbase}_${_pkgver}_${_arch}.deb
    
      24)
    
      25sha256sums=('482b648bafd5ff4753aa67acd61feff2ae08dce212db98638fce94a29b049f4b')
    
      26package() {
    
      27    tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      28    install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system"
    
      29    mv "${pkgdir}/lib/systemd/system/${pkgbase}.service" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
    
      30    rm -Rf "${pkgdir}/lib"
    
      31}
    
      32
    
      33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2