umeet-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from 'didivc.systeccloud.com', which is not the official 'umeet.com.cn' domain. This is a third-party host unrelated to the stated vendor URL, creating a genuine supply-chain risk: if this host is compromised or is a personal/unofficial mirror, users would execute arbitrary code. The source URL also uses 'latest' in the path with no version pinning in the filename itself (just 'umeet_amd64.deb'), meaning the sha256sum provides integrity only for the specific version at time of packaging, but future installs could silently pull a different binary if the checksum is not re-verified. The package installs an executed binary (a .deb unpacked directly into pkgdir), amplifying the impact. The sha256sum does provide some protection against tampering after the fact, but the non-official host origin is the core concern. This is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://didivc.systeccloud.com/client/latest/${_pkgname}_amd64.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from 'didivc.systeccloud.com', which is not the official 'umeet.com.cn' domain. This is a third-party host unrelated to the stated vendor URL, creating a genuine supply-chain risk: if this host is compromised or is a personal/unofficial mirror, users would execute arbitrary code. The source URL also uses 'latest' in the path with no version pinning in the filename itself (just 'umeet_amd64.deb'), meaning the sha256sum provides integrity only for the specific version at time of packaging, but future installs could silently pull a different binary if the checksum is not re-verified. The package installs an executed binary (a .deb unpacked directly into pkgdir), amplifying the impact. The sha256sum does provide some protection against tampering after the fact, but the non-official host origin is the core concern. This is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: lightning1141 <lightning1141@gmail.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=umeet-bin
    
      4_pkgname=umeet
    
      5# the versin is from deb package
    
      6pkgver=5.5.105.0315
    
      7pkgrel=0
    
      8pkgdesc="Umeet - https://www.umeet.com.cn/"
    
      9arch=("x86_64")
    
      10url="https://www.umeet.com.cn/"
    
      11license=('custom')
    
      12depends=()
    
      13
    
      14source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://didivc.systeccloud.com/client/latest/${_pkgname}_amd64.deb")
    
      15
    
      16sha256sums=('6195ffe2bf7c182c59e1a95b3f9d7bb1242dc25c3a8ad02c4b7d5d79ad0a84ee')
    
      17
    
      18package() {
    
      19    tar xf data.tar.xz -C ${pkgdir}/
    
      20}
    
      21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2