umeet-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from 'didivc.systeccloud.com', which is not the official 'umeet.com.cn' domain. This is a third-party host unrelated to the stated vendor URL, creating a genuine supply-chain risk: if this host is compromised or is a personal/unofficial mirror, users would execute arbitrary code. The source URL also uses 'latest' in the path with no version pinning in the filename itself (just 'umeet_amd64.deb'), meaning the sha256sum provides integrity only for the specific version at time of packaging, but future installs could silently pull a different binary if the checksum is not re-verified. The package installs an executed binary (a .deb unpacked directly into pkgdir), amplifying the impact. The sha256sum does provide some protection against tampering after the fact, but the non-official host origin is the core concern. This is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://didivc.systeccloud.com/client/latest/${_pkgname}_amd64.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from 'didivc.systeccloud.com', which is not the official 'umeet.com.cn' domain. This is a third-party host unrelated to the stated vendor URL, creating a genuine supply-chain risk: if this host is compromised or is a personal/unofficial mirror, users would execute arbitrary code. The source URL also uses 'latest' in the path with no version pinning in the filename itself (just 'umeet_amd64.deb'), meaning the sha256sum provides integrity only for the specific version at time of packaging, but future installs could silently pull a different binary if the checksum is not re-verified. The package installs an executed binary (a .deb unpacked directly into pkgdir), amplifying the impact. The sha256sum does provide some protection against tampering after the fact, but the non-official host origin is the core concern. This is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: lightning1141 <lightning1141@gmail.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=umeet-bin
    
      4_pkgname=umeet
    
      5# the versin is from deb package
    
      6pkgver=5.5.105.0315
    
      7pkgrel=0
    
      8pkgdesc="Umeet - https://www.umeet.com.cn/"
    
      9arch=("x86_64")
    
      10url="https://www.umeet.com.cn/"
    
      11license=('custom')
    
      12depends=()
    
      13
    
      14source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://didivc.systeccloud.com/client/latest/${_pkgname}_amd64.deb")
    
      15
    
      16sha256sums=('6195ffe2bf7c182c59e1a95b3f9d7bb1242dc25c3a8ad02c4b7d5d79ad0a84ee')
    
      17
    
      18package() {
    
      19    tar xf data.tar.xz -C ${pkgdir}/
    
      20}
    
      21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2