unihedron-device-manager

maintainer Nudelsalat · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from unihedron.com, which is the official vendor website for the Unihedron Device Manager product (a sky quality meter device manager). While this is the legitimate upstream vendor host rather than a random personal host, it is still a prebuilt binary being extracted and installed directly — not built from source. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the vendor themselves shipping a malicious binary. The risk is real but typical for AUR packages that repackage vendor-provided binaries: if unihedron.com were compromised or the binary itself contains malicious code, it would execute with user privileges. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-major-platform host with no source code review possible), not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:9 source=(http://unihedron.com/projects/darksky/cd/Linux/udm_amd64_${pkgver}.deb)

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from unihedron.com, which is the official vendor website for the Unihedron Device Manager product (a sky quality meter device manager). While this is the legitimate upstream vendor host rather than a random personal host, it is still a prebuilt binary being extracted and installed directly — not built from source. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the vendor themselves shipping a malicious binary. The risk is real but typical for AUR packages that repackage vendor-provided binaries: if unihedron.com were compromised or the binary itself contains malicious code, it would execute with user privileges. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-major-platform host with no source code review possible), not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1#Maintainer: Nudelsalat <nudelsalat@clouz.de>
    
      2pkgname=unihedron-device-manager
    
      3pkgver=1.0.0.266
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc='Unihedron Device Manager'
    
      6url=http://unihedron.com/projects/darksky/cd/
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8license=('GPL3')
    
      9source=(http://unihedron.com/projects/darksky/cd/Linux/udm_amd64_${pkgver}.deb)
    
      10sha256sums=('6344ab38f2117755cb7c86c56d4ed38365ca0d735946354df7ab779a25f6063a')
    
      11depends=('gtk2' 'libglvnd')
    
      12
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15    cd "${srcdir}"
    
      16
    
      17    # Extract programm files
    
      18    tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      19
    
      20    # Fix permissions
    
      21    chown -R root:root "${pkgdir}"
    
      22    chmod -R g-w "${pkgdir}"
    
      23    chmod -R u-s "${pkgdir}"
    
      24    chmod -R g-s "${pkgdir}"
    
      25}
    
      26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2