utools
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from publish.u-tools.cn, which is the official CDN/distribution host for the uTools application (a legitimate Chinese productivity launcher). The domain is operated by the uTools vendor (u.tools). While not a well-known Western forge, this is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure, analogous to how other proprietary apps distribute via their own CDN. A sha512 checksum is present, mitigating substitution attacks at rest, but the checksum only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it does not protect against the vendor pushing a malicious update (the version is pinned so this is less of a concern). The real concern is that this installs a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a Chinese vendor's CDN directly into /opt, with no source verification beyond the checksum. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-auditable, non-reproducible source), which warrants medium severity, but there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or piracy.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=("https://publish.u-tools.cn/version2/utools_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from publish.u-tools.cn, which is the official CDN/distribution host for the uTools application (a legitimate Chinese productivity launcher). The domain is operated by the uTools vendor (u.tools). While not a well-known Western forge, this is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure, analogous to how other proprietary apps distribute via their own CDN. A sha512 checksum is present, mitigating substitution attacks at rest, but the checksum only protects against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — it does not protect against the vendor pushing a malicious update (the version is pinned so this is less of a concern). The real concern is that this installs a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a Chinese vendor's CDN directly into /opt, with no source verification beyond the checksum. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-auditable, non-reproducible source), which warrants medium severity, but there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or piracy.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jack Chen <redchenjs@live.com>
pkgname=utools
pkgver=6.1.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="uTools Utilities"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://u.tools/"
license=('custom')
depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'alsa-lib' 'openssl-1.1')
source=("https://publish.u-tools.cn/version2/utools_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
sha512sums=('509c5abd5ddd96b13105069f04ffca7d4aee0fd04bfbfaa4be507830dd6dc732c2e3f94c4bc5379e36f8b58929220bda56a3448821503b4fd47315619e0ada77')
package() {
tar -xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$pkgdir/"
install -dm755 "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
ln -s /opt/uTools/utools "$pkgdir/usr/bin/utools"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |