vagga-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer antigluk 4 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt binary tarball from files.zerogw.com (a personal/project host, not an official distribution mirror) outside of the source=() array, meaning no checksums are verified by makepkg. The version is dynamically resolved at build time by scraping an HTML page, and the downloaded tarball is extracted and installed via a shell script (install.sh) — all executed code from an unverified, non-reproducible source. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if files.zerogw.com is compromised or the content is swapped, arbitrary binaries would be installed with no integrity check. The curl command also has a bug (-O and the URL are swapped, so the pipe to tar would fail), but the security concern about unverified binary execution from a non-official host remains valid regardless. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

  • PKGBUILD:5 curl -s http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/latest-testing.html | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' -e 's/vagga-//g' -e 's/.tar.xz//g'
  • PKGBUILD:33 curl -O vagga.tar.xz "http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/vagga-`vagga_source_version`.tar.xz" | tar -xJ -C "$pkgname"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt binary tarball from files.zerogw.com (a personal/project host, not an official distribution mirror) outside of the source=() array, meaning no checksums are verified by makepkg. The version is dynamically resolved at build time by scraping an HTML page, and the downloaded tarball is extracted and installed via a shell script (install.sh) — all executed code from an unverified, non-reproducible source. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if files.zerogw.com is compromised or the content is swapped, arbitrary binaries would be installed with no integrity check. The curl command also has a bug (-O and the URL are swapped, so the pipe to tar would fail), but the security concern about unverified binary execution from a non-official host remains valid regardless. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Roman Rader <antigluk@gmail.com>
2pkgname=vagga-bin
3
4vagga_source_version() {
5 curl -s http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/latest-testing.html | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' -e 's/vagga-//g' -e 's/.tar.xz//g'
6}
7pkgver() {
8 vagga_source_version | tr '-' '_'
9}
10pkgver=0.8.0_85_g0c7e8a4
11pkgrel=1
12pkgdesc="Vagga is a containerisation tool without daemons"
13arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
14url="http://vagga.readthedocs.org"
15license=('MIT')
16depends=('shadow')
17makedepends=()
18checkdepends=()
19optdepends=()
20provides=()
21conflicts=()
22replaces=()
23backup=()
24options=()
25install=vagga.install
26changelog=
27source=()
28noextract=()
29
30prepare() {
31 [ -d "$pkgname" ] && rm -r "$pkgname"
32 mkdir "$pkgname"
33 curl -O vagga.tar.xz "http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/vagga-`vagga_source_version`.tar.xz" | tar -xJ -C "$pkgname"
34}
35
36package() {
37 cd "$pkgname"/vagga
38 export DESTDIR="$pkgdir"
39 export PREFIX=/usr
40 bash install.sh
41}
42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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