vagga-bin
The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt binary tarball from files.zerogw.com (a personal/project host, not an official distribution mirror) outside of the source=() array, meaning no checksums are verified by makepkg. The version is dynamically resolved at build time by scraping an HTML page, and the downloaded tarball is extracted and installed via a shell script (install.sh) — all executed code from an unverified, non-reproducible source. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if files.zerogw.com is compromised or the content is swapped, arbitrary binaries would be installed with no integrity check. The curl command also has a bug (-O and the URL are swapped, so the pipe to tar would fail), but the security concern about unverified binary execution from a non-official host remains valid regardless. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.
Triggered rules
external_download_not_in_source
curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.
-
PKGBUILD:5
curl -s http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/latest-testing.html | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' -e 's/vagga-//g' -e 's/.tar.xz//g' -
PKGBUILD:33
curl -O vagga.tar.xz "http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/vagga-`vagga_source_version`.tar.xz" | tar -xJ -C "$pkgname"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt binary tarball from files.zerogw.com (a personal/project host, not an official distribution mirror) outside of the source=() array, meaning no checksums are verified by makepkg. The version is dynamically resolved at build time by scraping an HTML page, and the downloaded tarball is extracted and installed via a shell script (install.sh) — all executed code from an unverified, non-reproducible source. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if files.zerogw.com is compromised or the content is swapped, arbitrary binaries would be installed with no integrity check. The curl command also has a bug (-O and the URL are swapped, so the pipe to tar would fail), but the security concern about unverified binary execution from a non-official host remains valid regardless. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.
PKGBUILD
2 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Roman Rader <antigluk@gmail.com>
pkgname=vagga-bin
vagga_source_version() {
curl -s http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/latest-testing.html | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' -e 's/vagga-//g' -e 's/.tar.xz//g'
}
pkgver() {
vagga_source_version | tr '-' '_'
}
pkgver=0.8.0_85_g0c7e8a4
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Vagga is a containerisation tool without daemons"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://vagga.readthedocs.org"
license=('MIT')
depends=('shadow')
makedepends=()
checkdepends=()
optdepends=()
provides=()
conflicts=()
replaces=()
backup=()
options=()
install=vagga.install
changelog=
source=()
noextract=()
prepare() {
[ -d "$pkgname" ] && rm -r "$pkgname"
mkdir "$pkgname"
curl -O vagga.tar.xz "http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/vagga-`vagga_source_version`.tar.xz" | tar -xJ -C "$pkgname"
}
package() {
cd "$pkgname"/vagga
export DESTDIR="$pkgdir"
export PREFIX=/usr
bash install.sh
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |