vagga-bin

maintainer antigluk · 4 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt binary tarball from files.zerogw.com (a personal/project host, not an official distribution mirror) outside of the source=() array, meaning no checksums are verified by makepkg. The version is dynamically resolved at build time by scraping an HTML page, and the downloaded tarball is extracted and installed via a shell script (install.sh) — all executed code from an unverified, non-reproducible source. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if files.zerogw.com is compromised or the content is swapped, arbitrary binaries would be installed with no integrity check. The curl command also has a bug (-O and the URL are swapped, so the pipe to tar would fail), but the security concern about unverified binary execution from a non-official host remains valid regardless. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

PKGBUILD:5 curl -s http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/latest-testing.html | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' -e 's/vagga-//g' -e 's/.tar.xz//g'
PKGBUILD:33 curl -O vagga.tar.xz "http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/vagga-`vagga_source_version`.tar.xz" | tar -xJ -C "$pkgname"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt binary tarball from files.zerogw.com (a personal/project host, not an official distribution mirror) outside of the source=() array, meaning no checksums are verified by makepkg. The version is dynamically resolved at build time by scraping an HTML page, and the downloaded tarball is extracted and installed via a shell script (install.sh) — all executed code from an unverified, non-reproducible source. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if files.zerogw.com is compromised or the content is swapped, arbitrary binaries would be installed with no integrity check. The curl command also has a bug (-O and the URL are swapped, so the pipe to tar would fail), but the security concern about unverified binary execution from a non-official host remains valid regardless. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Roman Rader <antigluk@gmail.com>
    
      2pkgname=vagga-bin
    
      3
    
      4vagga_source_version() {
    
      5	curl -s http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/latest-testing.html | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' -e 's/vagga-//g' -e 's/.tar.xz//g'
    
      6}
    
      7pkgver() {
    
      8	vagga_source_version | tr '-' '_'
    
      9}
    
      10pkgver=0.8.0_85_g0c7e8a4
    
      11pkgrel=1
    
      12pkgdesc="Vagga is a containerisation tool without daemons"
    
      13arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      14url="http://vagga.readthedocs.org"
    
      15license=('MIT')
    
      16depends=('shadow')
    
      17makedepends=()
    
      18checkdepends=()
    
      19optdepends=()
    
      20provides=()
    
      21conflicts=()
    
      22replaces=()
    
      23backup=()
    
      24options=()
    
      25install=vagga.install
    
      26changelog=
    
      27source=()
    
      28noextract=()
    
      29
    
      30prepare() {
    
      31	[ -d "$pkgname" ] && rm -r "$pkgname"
    
      32	mkdir "$pkgname"
    
      33	curl -O vagga.tar.xz "http://files.zerogw.com/vagga/vagga-`vagga_source_version`.tar.xz" | tar -xJ -C "$pkgname"
    
      34}
    
      35
    
      36package() {
    
      37	cd "$pkgname"/vagga
    
      38	export DESTDIR="$pkgdir"
    
      39	export PREFIX=/usr
    
      40	bash install.sh
    
      41}
    
      42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2