vectr

maintainer elisaverga · 7 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary archives from download.vectr.com, which is the official vendor's download host for the Vectr desktop application. The binaries are Electron-based executables that are installed directly to /opt/vectr and symlinked into /usr/bin. While download.vectr.com appears to be the legitimate vendor host (matching the official product URL vectr.com), it is not a well-known package repository or CDN, and the package installs unverified prebuilt binaries with no build-from-source option. SHA256 checksums are provided, which mitigates tampering risk but does not address the trust question of the binary origin. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — this is a standard pattern for proprietary Electron app AUR packages, and the host matches the vendor domain. The medium rating is appropriate given the executed binary from a non-standard (though vendor-controlled) host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source_i686=(http://download.vectr.com/desktop/${pkgver}/linux/Vectr-${pkgver}-ia32.zip)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary archives from download.vectr.com, which is the official vendor's download host for the Vectr desktop application. The binaries are Electron-based executables that are installed directly to /opt/vectr and symlinked into /usr/bin. While download.vectr.com appears to be the legitimate vendor host (matching the official product URL vectr.com), it is not a well-known package repository or CDN, and the package installs unverified prebuilt binaries with no build-from-source option. SHA256 checksums are provided, which mitigates tampering risk but does not address the trust question of the binary origin. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — this is a standard pattern for proprietary Electron app AUR packages, and the host matches the vendor domain. The medium rating is appropriate given the executed binary from a non-standard (though vendor-controlled) host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Contributor: Gergely Imreh <imrehg@gmail.com>
2# Contributor: Denis Vadimov <me@bloody.pw>
3
4pkgname=vectr
5pkgdesc='Vector graphics design app'
6pkgver=0.1.16
7pkgrel=1
8arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
9url='https://vectr.com/'
10license=('custom')
11depends=('gtk2' 'gdk-pixbuf2' 'alsa-lib' 'nss' 'libxtst' 'libxss' 'gconf' 'pango<=1:1.44.1')
12makedepends=()
13source=('vectr.desktop'
14 'vectr.svg')
15source_i686=(http://download.vectr.com/desktop/${pkgver}/linux/Vectr-${pkgver}-ia32.zip)
16source_x86_64=(http://download.vectr.com/desktop/${pkgver}/linux/Vectr-${pkgver}.zip)
17
18sha256sums=('0bf55bed71f68c0fb998d8a12da6fa6ac1f927775ebc8c11d9f754667b76d18f'
19 '0b273cda8c53c94de884efb400ff1d57c75101c966db695f3622f190669e1af9')
20sha256sums_i686=('53e0bd072ea96558bac30aac4fdd6b4d2744567b329f869cb556962776164f01')
21sha256sums_x86_64=('48c0ad4208c11725cae941e179789e87b674c2d3de26419deb0cddc17dbe5471')
22
23package() {
24 if [ "$CARCH" = "i686" ]; then
25 _source_arch="-ia32"
26 fi
27 _source_path="linux${_source_arch}-unpacked"
28
29 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
30
31 cp -R "${srcdir}/${_source_path}" "${pkgdir}/opt/vectr"
32 install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
33 ln -s ../../opt/vectr/vectr "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/vectr"
34
35 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/vectr.svg" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/${pkgname}.svg"
36 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/vectr.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/vectr.desktop"
37
38 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${_source_path}/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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