vide-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer chrs 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
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Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binaries (the VIDE executable and three libMagick*.so.5 shared libraries) from a personal/project website (riintouge.com) that is not an official distribution mirror or well-known vendor host. The libMagick libraries are installed into /usr/lib/vide/ and loaded at runtime, and the VIDE binary itself is executed. While sha512sums are provided for these files (providing some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering), the checksums only protect against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — if the host owner updates the files and the PKGBUILD maintainer updates the checksums, users get whatever the host serves. The core concern is that these are executed native binaries/libraries from a single personal domain with no independent verification (no GPG signature, no reproducible build). This is a genuine supply-chain risk: medium severity is appropriate. The cheaper model's assessment is correct here.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:10 source=('http://www.riintouge.com/archive/VIDE/VIDE_latest_64.tar.gz'
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binaries (the VIDE executable and three libMagick*.so.5 shared libraries) from a personal/project website (riintouge.com) that is not an official distribution mirror or well-known vendor host. The libMagick libraries are installed into /usr/lib/vide/ and loaded at runtime, and the VIDE binary itself is executed. While sha512sums are provided for these files (providing some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering), the checksums only protect against accidental corruption or a one-time swap — if the host owner updates the files and the PKGBUILD maintainer updates the checksums, users get whatever the host serves. The core concern is that these are executed native binaries/libraries from a single personal domain with no independent verification (no GPG signature, no reproducible build). This is a genuine supply-chain risk: medium severity is appropriate. The cheaper model's assessment is correct here.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=vide-bin
2pkgver=0.45a
3pkgrel=1
4pkgdesc='A toolkit for the Source engine aimed at aiding mappers and modders alike.'
5arch=('x86_64')
6url='http://www.riintouge.com/VIDE/'
7license=('unknown')
8depends=('icu67' 'qt4' 'lcms2' 'freetype2' 'liblqr' 'glib2' 'fontconfig' 'libxext' 'libxt' 'xz' 'bzip2' 'zlib' 'libtool' 'libx11')
9makedepends=('patchelf')
10source=('http://www.riintouge.com/archive/VIDE/VIDE_latest_64.tar.gz'
11 'http://www.riintouge.com/archive/VIDE/lib64/libMagick++.so.5'
12 'http://www.riintouge.com/archive/VIDE/lib64/libMagickCore.so.5'
13 'http://www.riintouge.com/archive/VIDE/lib64/libMagickWand.so.5'
14 'vide-wrapper'
15 'VIDE.desktop'
16 'vide.xml')
17sha512sums=('82dc328bca33cdce139131132f18bc2e9a2776af648fcce0850aadb19a02593c906eb6b15b266067e4f184b1c0a76d0f41f7df5bc08e3311988351f4f1425dde'
18 'a36802b973935ceb372ccb97054fe3b95ed6b403c496601efd22f8f342065838a09263649e699de0dbfd9f94084306f3f17000caf127eaf2ce5d7980580a7def'
19 '974a423686c95a10b108466532dfca7aad714bfc39c5dcc5b343bd27ccce0cfc0510aea8af396a1adb2143f5c04e4a78df44d5b150638dc8109d7c6249694a2a'
20 '9fd337fd08e0e2c98d21e132b4e5af01c4f21d077b0f39225fe0657b974c7c58f6b194c8e907def127ff84c35c7f1a42e52ac21d83e0d778ce43f4c14638ac0a'
21 'SKIP'
22 'SKIP'
23 'SKIP')
24
25build() {
26 patchelf --remove-rpath VIDE/VIDE
27}
28
29package() {
30 install -Dm755 vide-wrapper "$pkgdir/usr/bin/VIDE"
31 install -Dm755 VIDE/VIDE "$pkgdir/usr/lib/vide/VIDE"
32 install -Dm755 -t "$pkgdir/usr/lib/vide/" VIDE/lib/libSingleApplication.so.1 libMagick++.so.5 libMagickCore.so.5 libMagickWand.so.5
33 install -Dm644 VIDE/noitazilait.ini "$pkgdir/usr/lib/vide/noitazilait.ini"
34
35 install -Dm755 VIDE.desktop "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/VIDE.desktop"
36 install -Dm644 vide.xml "$pkgdir/usr/share/mime/packages/vide.xml"
37 install -Dm644 VIDE/deploy/multi_manager_icon_48.png "$pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/multi_manager_icon_48.png"
38}
39

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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