vivi

maintainer DuBistKomisch · 6 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from downloads.vivi.io (the official vendor domain for vivi.io) and installs it directly without compilation. This is a standard pattern for closed-source AUR packages that repackage vendor-provided binaries. The domain is the official vendor download host, not a personal or unofficial mirror, which reduces supply-chain risk. However, the package installs an opaque prebuilt binary blob, uses only MD5 (weak checksum, no SHA256/b2), and the license is listed as 'unknown'. The bsdtar extraction also assumes data.tar.xz is already present in the build directory without explicitly extracting it from the .deb first (missing `bsdtar -xf ${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb` step to get data.tar.xz), which could be a functional issue. Overall this is a legitimate but imperfect binary repackaging from an official vendor host — the medium rating is appropriate due to the executed binary from a closed-source vendor with weak integrity verification, though it is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://downloads.vivi.io/app/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from downloads.vivi.io (the official vendor domain for vivi.io) and installs it directly without compilation. This is a standard pattern for closed-source AUR packages that repackage vendor-provided binaries. The domain is the official vendor download host, not a personal or unofficial mirror, which reduces supply-chain risk. However, the package installs an opaque prebuilt binary blob, uses only MD5 (weak checksum, no SHA256/b2), and the license is listed as 'unknown'. The bsdtar extraction also assumes data.tar.xz is already present in the build directory without explicitly extracting it from the .deb first (missing `bsdtar -xf ${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb` step to get data.tar.xz), which could be a functional issue. Overall this is a legitimate but imperfect binary repackaging from an official vendor host — the medium rating is appropriate due to the executed binary from a closed-source vendor with weak integrity verification, though it is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Jake Barnes <me+aur@jakebarn.es>
    
      2pkgname=vivi
    
      3pkgver=3.12.0
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Client for Vivi, a wireless screen sharing solution"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="http://vivi.io"
    
      8license=('unknown')
    
      9depends=('gtk3' 'libxss' 'nss' 'glib2' 'libpulse' 'libx11')
    
      10source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://downloads.vivi.io/app/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb")
    
      11md5sums=('0589d8c05afe4068a050b9039dc5917b')
    
      12
    
      13package() {
    
      14  msg2 "Extracting the data.tar.xz..."
    
      15  bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir/"
    
      16}
    
      17

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2