vk-calls-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer sandboiii 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from vkcalls-native-ac.vk-apps.com, which is a VK (VKontakte) subdomain used for distributing their native application. VK is a major Russian social network and vk-apps.com is their official app distribution domain, so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint. The sha256 checksum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the binary is a closed-source prebuilt executable from a non-standard packaging channel (not a distro mirror or well-known release page like GitHub releases), and the application itself is a proprietary VK product. The supply-chain concern is real but moderate: if vk-apps.com is compromised or the maintainer updates the URL without updating the checksum, a malicious binary could be installed. This is a standard 'bin' AUR package pattern with the usual risks of prebuilt proprietary binaries. The medium rating is appropriate — it is not a clear attack, but it is an executed binary from a vendor-controlled CDN that cannot be independently audited.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:15 source=("${pkgbasename}-${pkgver}-amd64.deb::https://vkcalls-native-ac.vk-apps.com/${pkgver}/${pkgbasename}-amd64.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from vkcalls-native-ac.vk-apps.com, which is a VK (VKontakte) subdomain used for distributing their native application. VK is a major Russian social network and vk-apps.com is their official app distribution domain, so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint. The sha256 checksum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the binary is a closed-source prebuilt executable from a non-standard packaging channel (not a distro mirror or well-known release page like GitHub releases), and the application itself is a proprietary VK product. The supply-chain concern is real but moderate: if vk-apps.com is compromised or the maintainer updates the URL without updating the checksum, a malicious binary could be installed. This is a standard 'bin' AUR package pattern with the usual risks of prebuilt proprietary binaries. The medium rating is appropriate — it is not a clear attack, but it is an executed binary from a vendor-controlled CDN that cannot be independently audited.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: sandboiii <archlinux at sandboiii dot xyz>
    
      2# Contributor: vtyulb
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=vk-calls-bin
    
      5pkgbasename='vk-calls'
    
      6pkgver=1.44.39190
    
      7pkgrel=2
    
      8pkgdesc="VK Calls for fast conference calls"
    
      9arch=('x86_64')
    
      10url="https://calls.vk.com"
    
      11license=('custom')
    
      12depends=('qt5-base' 'qt5-multimedia' 'qt5-svg' 'qt5-webengine' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'icu76' 'libvpx1.15')
    
      13options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
    
      14install=$pkgname.install
    
      15source=("${pkgbasename}-${pkgver}-amd64.deb::https://vkcalls-native-ac.vk-apps.com/${pkgver}/${pkgbasename}-amd64.deb")
    
      16sha256sums=('3723dcbdcb43fb6c13ad2408a56fdc3d1447abb44f2edcc7e2add3dbc0fbcec1')
    
      17
    
      18package() {
    
      19    # Extract package data
    
      20    tar xzf data.tar.gz --no-same-owner -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      21
    
      22    # Fix directory structure differences
    
      23    mv "${pkgdir}/usr/local/bin" "${pkgdir}/usr/"
    
      24    rm -rf "${pkgdir}/usr/local"
    
      25}
    
      26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2