vk-messenger-appimage

MEDIUM

maintainer kuhtoxo 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from upload.object2.vk-apps.com, which is VK's own CDN/object storage infrastructure (vk-apps.com is the official VK developer platform domain). The URL contains a UUID-style path component suggesting a specific release artifact. However, the host is not a canonical, well-known release endpoint (like GitHub releases or an official distro mirror), and the path structure with a UUID could be rotated or substituted without changing the URL. The AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract, meaning arbitrary code in the AppImage runs at build time. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates substitution risk for this specific version, but future pkgver bumps would fetch a new binary from the same unofficial-looking CDN path. The overall pattern — prebuilt binary from a non-canonical vendor CDN, executed at build time — is a genuine medium supply-chain concern, consistent with the original rating. It is not clearly malicious (vk-apps.com is legitimately VK's domain), but the execution of a downloaded binary from a non-standard host warrants medium severity.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:20 https://upload.object2.vk-apps.com/vk-me-desktop-dev-5837a06d-5f28-484a-ac22-045903cb1b1a/latest/${_filename}

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from upload.object2.vk-apps.com, which is VK's own CDN/object storage infrastructure (vk-apps.com is the official VK developer platform domain). The URL contains a UUID-style path component suggesting a specific release artifact. However, the host is not a canonical, well-known release endpoint (like GitHub releases or an official distro mirror), and the path structure with a UUID could be rotated or substituted without changing the URL. The AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract, meaning arbitrary code in the AppImage runs at build time. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates substitution risk for this specific version, but future pkgver bumps would fetch a new binary from the same unofficial-looking CDN path. The overall pattern — prebuilt binary from a non-canonical vendor CDN, executed at build time — is a genuine medium supply-chain concern, consistent with the original rating. It is not clearly malicious (vk-apps.com is legitimately VK's domain), but the execution of a downloaded binary from a non-standard host warrants medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: KUHTOXO https://aur.archlinux.org/account/kuhtoxo
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=vk-messenger-appimage
    
      4pkgver=6.0.57.36
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="VK Messenger for Linux in the appimage package format"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://vk.me/app"
    
      9license=('custom')
    
      10replaces=("vk-messenger")
    
      11options=(!strip)
    
      12
    
      13_app_name="vk-messenger"
    
      14_filename="${_app_name}.AppImage"
    
      15_squashfs_desktop_file="${_app_name}.desktop"
    
      16_squashfs_icon_file="${_app_name}.png"
    
      17_install_path="/opt/appimages"
    
      18
    
      19source=(
    
      20    https://upload.object2.vk-apps.com/vk-me-desktop-dev-5837a06d-5f28-484a-ac22-045903cb1b1a/latest/${_filename}
    
      21)
    
      22noextract=("${_filename}")
    
      23sha256sums=('b0fe3b7f8a9cbffa19e23413101032864fbd8aa860c50c52312025006ce85a8c')
    
      24
    
      25prepare() {
    
      26    cd ${srcdir}
    
      27    chmod a+x ${_filename}
    
      28    ./"${_filename}" --appimage-extract > /dev/null
    
      29    sed 's|Exec=AppRun|Exec='${_install_path}${_filename}'|g' -i "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${_squashfs_desktop_file}"
    
      30}
    
      31
    
      32package() {
    
      33    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${_filename}" "${pkgdir}${_install_path}${_appimage_name}"
    
      34
    
      35    # install icons
    
      36    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
    
      37    cp -dpr --no-preserve=ownership "squashfs-root/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share"
    
      38    chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
    
      39    find "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons" -type f -name "${_squashfs_icon_file}" -exec chmod 644 {} \;
    
      40
    
      41    # install appication desktop file
    
      42    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${_squashfs_desktop_file}" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
    
      43}
    
      44

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2