vk-messenger-bin

maintainer kuhtoxo · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary (containing an Electron-based application) from upload.object2.vk-apps.com. The domain vk-apps.com is VK's own developer/CDN domain (used for VK Mini Apps and related infrastructure), so this is not a completely random personal host. However, the URL path contains what looks like a UUID/build identifier and 'dev' in the path, suggesting this may be a development/staging artifact URL rather than an official stable release endpoint. The binary is executed directly (it's an RPM that gets unpacked and installed into /opt and /usr), and there is no signature verification beyond a sha256sum. The sha256sum does provide integrity protection against accidental corruption but not against a compromised upstream host serving a different binary with a matching hash update. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from a non-canonical URL path (dev build endpoint) with no GPG signature verification. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: if the upstream host or path is compromised or the URL is later reused for different content, users would execute arbitrary code. The sha256sum is pinned which mitigates silent substitution but does not eliminate the risk of the maintainer updating it to a malicious value.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:26 https://upload.object2.vk-apps.com/vk-me-desktop-dev-5837a06d-5f28-484a-ac22-045903cb1b1a/latest/${_app_bin_name}
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary (containing an Electron-based application) from upload.object2.vk-apps.com. The domain vk-apps.com is VK's own developer/CDN domain (used for VK Mini Apps and related infrastructure), so this is not a completely random personal host. However, the URL path contains what looks like a UUID/build identifier and 'dev' in the path, suggesting this may be a development/staging artifact URL rather than an official stable release endpoint. The binary is executed directly (it's an RPM that gets unpacked and installed into /opt and /usr), and there is no signature verification beyond a sha256sum. The sha256sum does provide integrity protection against accidental corruption but not against a compromised upstream host serving a different binary with a matching hash update. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from a non-canonical URL path (dev build endpoint) with no GPG signature verification. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: if the upstream host or path is compromised or the URL is later reused for different content, users would execute arbitrary code. The sha256sum is pinned which mitigates silent substitution but does not eliminate the risk of the maintainer updating it to a malicious value.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: KUHTOXO https://aur.archlinux.org/account/kuhtoxo
2
3pkgname=vk-messenger-bin
4pkgver=6.0.57.36
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="VK Messenger for Linux from rpm package"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://vk.me/app"
9license=('ISC')
10replaces=(
11 'vk-messenger'
12 'vk-messenger-appimage'
13)
14depends=(
15 'pulse-native-provider'
16)
17optdepends=(
18 'libappindicator-gtk3'
19)
20options=(!strip)
21
22_app_name="vk-messenger"
23_app_bin_name=${_app_name}".rpm"
24
25source=(
26 https://upload.object2.vk-apps.com/vk-me-desktop-dev-5837a06d-5f28-484a-ac22-045903cb1b1a/latest/${_app_bin_name}
27)
28sha256sums=('5d4e9d5f8e329843e6738a43f3741859628df16b701d0aef461320091b718904')
29
30package() {
31 cp -a "${srcdir}/opt/" "${pkgdir}/opt/"
32 cp -a "${srcdir}/usr/" "${pkgdir}/usr/"
33}
34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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