vuze-extreme-mod

maintainer thilodoring · 13 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt mod zip (VPEM_5750-00.zip) from sb-innovation.de, a third-party forum/community site, not an official upstream vendor or well-known mirror. This zip is extracted and its contents are placed directly into /opt/$pkgname/, meaning arbitrary files from this unverified host are installed as executable application code. While an MD5 checksum is present, MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides only weak integrity guarantees against accidental corruption, not against a deliberate substitution attack. The host sb-innovation.de is a private community site with no verifiable chain of custody. The mod itself is described as providing 'spoofing capabilities', which is a legitimate BitTorrent client feature (peer ID spoofing) but also means the package is inherently a modified/unofficial build. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed code from a non-official, personal/community host with only MD5 verification. The main Vuze source comes from SourceForge (official upstream), which is fine. The risk is specifically the mod zip from sb-innovation.de.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:23 'http://www.sb-innovation.de/attachments/f41/17559d1488493507-vuze-extreme-mod-sb-innovation-5-7-5-0-vpem_5750-00.zip'
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt mod zip (VPEM_5750-00.zip) from sb-innovation.de, a third-party forum/community site, not an official upstream vendor or well-known mirror. This zip is extracted and its contents are placed directly into /opt/$pkgname/, meaning arbitrary files from this unverified host are installed as executable application code. While an MD5 checksum is present, MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides only weak integrity guarantees against accidental corruption, not against a deliberate substitution attack. The host sb-innovation.de is a private community site with no verifiable chain of custody. The mod itself is described as providing 'spoofing capabilities', which is a legitimate BitTorrent client feature (peer ID spoofing) but also means the package is inherently a modified/unofficial build. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed code from a non-official, personal/community host with only MD5 verification. The main Vuze source comes from SourceForge (official upstream), which is fine. The risk is specifically the mod zip from sb-innovation.de.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Det <nimetonmaili g-mail>
2# Contributor: joseph28cb
3
4# Choose, which icons to use for menus and system tray ("blue", "gray" or "default").
5_icon="default"
6
7pkgname=vuze-extreme-mod
8pkgver=5.7.5.0
9_ver=5750
10pkgrel=1
11pkgdesc="A modded version of the Vuze BitTorrent client with multiple spoofing capabilities"
12arch=('x86_64')
13url="http://www.sb-innovation.de/f41/"
14license=('GPL')
15depends=('desktop-file-utils' 'java-runtime')
16optdepends=('vuze-plugin-countrylocator: Country flags for the "Peers" tab'
17 'vuze-plugin-mldht: The alternative Distributed Hash Table implementation (DHT) used by µTorrent'
18 'xulrunner192: Needed for the channels GUI')
19provides=('vuze')
20options=('!strip')
21install=$pkgname.install
22source=("http://downloads.sourceforge.net/azureus/vuze/Vuze_${_ver}/Vuze_${_ver}_linux.tar.bz2"
23 'http://www.sb-innovation.de/attachments/f41/17559d1488493507-vuze-extreme-mod-sb-innovation-5-7-5-0-vpem_5750-00.zip'
24 {blue,gray}_{16,32,64,128}.png)
25noextract=($(basename ${source[1]}))
26md5sums=('fb8f224700331de86caa8648418fb41b'
27 '05c0d1c5bd369abbd1f38556703c2524'
28 '5eba696cfcc430504706f476e13b2ade'
29 'a4cae0c46a6ac56322753f96f52b8f74'
30 '5eba696cfcc430504706f476e13b2ade'
31 '74fd7cf4d05e5c2111ec2dbf62b3c9d8'
32 '4374a188968bf9f09cab090ca7d33ce4'
33 '484182b170741132ffe2d78c6feaf230'
34 '4374a188968bf9f09cab090ca7d33ce4'
35 'db19086ba7bd8eefee05538f4c65aa68')
36
37package() {
38 rm -rf VPEM_*
39 cd vuze
40
41 msg2 "Creating directory structure..."
42 install -d "$pkgdir"/opt/$pkgname/
43 install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/
44 install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications/
45 install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/
46 install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/
47
48 msg2 "Moving stuff in place..."
49 # Launcher
50 mv vuze "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/$pkgname
51
52 # swt.jar
53 mv swt/swt64.jar "$pkgdir"/opt/$pkgname/swt.jar
54
55 # Icon and desktop
56 mv vuze.png "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/$pkgname.png
57 mv vuze.desktop "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop
58
59 # Licenses
60 for i in GPL.txt GPLv3.txt LICENSES.txt TOS.txt; do
61 mv $i "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/
62 done
63
64 msg2 "Removing redundancies..."
65 rm -r swt/
66 rm azureus
67 rm installer.log
68 rm README.txt
69 rm vuze.schemas
70
71 msg2 "Installing to /opt..."
72 mv * "$pkgdir"/opt/$pkgname/
73
74 msg2 "Fixing paths..."
75 sed -i "s|#PROGRAM_DIR=.*|PROGRAM_DIR=\"/opt/$pkgname\"|" "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/$pkgname
76
77 msg2 "Adding support for magnet links..."
78 sed -r -e "s|Name=Vuze|Name=Vuze Extreme Mod|" \
79 -e "s|Exec=vuze %f|Exec=$pkgname %U|" \
80 -e "s|Icon=vuze.png|Icon=$pkgname.png|" \
81 -e "s|(x-bittorrent)|\1;x-scheme-handler/magnet;|" \
82 -i "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop
83
84 msg2 "Installing Extreme Mod..."
85 bsdtar -xf "$srcdir"/$(basename ${source[1]})
86 mv "$srcdir"/vuze/VPEM_*/* "$pkgdir"/opt/$pkgname/
87
88 # Different icons for menus and systray
89 if [[ $_icon = blue ]] || [[ $_icon = gray ]]; then
90 msg2 "Using alternative $_icon icons..."
91
92 # Menus
93 cd "$srcdir"
94 install -m644 ${_icon}_128.png "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/$pkgname.png
95
96 # Extract .jar
97 install -d tmp/
98 bsdtar -xf $(basename ${source[1]}) Azureus2.jar
99 bsdtar -xf Azureus2.jar -C tmp/
100
101 # Place icons
102 for i in 16 32 64 128; do
103 install -m644 ${_icon}_${i}.png tmp/org/gudy/azureus2/ui/icons/a${i}.png
104 done
105
106 # Recreate .jar
107 cd tmp
108 jar cf Azureus2.jar ./*/
109
110 # Install
111 install -m644 Azureus2.jar "$pkgdir"/opt/$pkgname/
112 fi
113}
114

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Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
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