warsaw

maintainer nicolascomman · 39 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.run file) from cloud.gastecnologia.com.br, which is the official distribution host for GAS Tecnologia's Warsaw banking security module (used by Banco do Brasil and other Brazilian banks). The host is the legitimate vendor's own CDN/cloud storage, not a random personal host. However, the concern is real: this is a closed-source, prebuilt binary that gets extracted and installed as a privileged security daemon with multiple shared libraries (.so files) and binaries running as root-level services. The sha256 checksums are present and pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at download time, but the binary itself is opaque and could contain anything. The package is well-known in the Brazilian Linux community and has been in the AUR for years. The medium rating is appropriate not because the host is suspicious per se, but because installing an opaque, closed-source binary security daemon from any vendor — even a legitimate one — carries inherent supply-chain risk: if the vendor's server is compromised or the vendor pushes a malicious update, users get arbitrary code execution with system-level access. This is a genuine medium-severity concern (executed binary from a non-open-source vendor host), not a false positive, but also not an active attack.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 source_x86_64=(https://cloud.gastecnologia.com.br/bb/downloads/ws/warsaw_64_installer.run)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.run file) from cloud.gastecnologia.com.br, which is the official distribution host for GAS Tecnologia's Warsaw banking security module (used by Banco do Brasil and other Brazilian banks). The host is the legitimate vendor's own CDN/cloud storage, not a random personal host. However, the concern is real: this is a closed-source, prebuilt binary that gets extracted and installed as a privileged security daemon with multiple shared libraries (.so files) and binaries running as root-level services. The sha256 checksums are present and pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at download time, but the binary itself is opaque and could contain anything. The package is well-known in the Brazilian Linux community and has been in the AUR for years. The medium rating is appropriate not because the host is suspicious per se, but because installing an opaque, closed-source binary security daemon from any vendor — even a legitimate one — carries inherent supply-chain risk: if the vendor's server is compromised or the vendor pushes a malicious update, users get arbitrary code execution with system-level access. This is a genuine medium-severity concern (executed binary from a non-open-source vendor host), not a false positive, but also not an active attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: afterSt0rm <ateles.1@gmail.com>
2# Contributor: Rafael Fontenlle <rafaelff@gnome.org>
3
4pkgname=warsaw
5pkgver=1.12.3.11
6pkgrel=3
7pkgdesc="Banking security tool developed by GAS Tecnologia"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url="https://seg.bb.com.br"
10license=('custom')
11depends=('openssl' 'nss')
12makedepends=('chrpath')
13options=(!strip)
14conflicts=('warsaw-bin')
15provides=('warsaw')
16source=(warsaw.service)
17source_x86_64=(https://cloud.gastecnologia.com.br/bb/downloads/ws/warsaw_64_installer.run)
18sha256sums=('dde06741817b8b77d9b1150bd10110d8b22330f8e2900fcae06dcedeee10a09e')
19sha256sums_x86_64=('d8d637a2910aed6ab5e9baa9d2bd85c00259ee133e4aa6219bbf7d1dd3b04f40')
20
21_installer=warsaw_64_installer.run
22_warsawdir=tmp/warsaw_x64
23
24prepare() {
25 cd $srcdir
26
27 # Make sure to have a cleaned up warsaw directory
28 [ ! -d $pkgname-$pkgver ] && mkdir $pkgname-$pkgver
29 [ -d $_warsawdir ] && rm -rf $_warsawdir
30
31 # Extracts the binary content starting from the line number "L"
32 # (L was informed within the installer)
33 L=363
34 tail -n +$L $_installer | tar -zxvf - -C $pkgname-$pkgver
35}
36
37build() {
38 cd $pkgname-$pkgver/$_warsawdir
39 ./configure --prefix=/usr --sysconfdir=/etc
40}
41
42package() {
43 cd $pkgname-$pkgver/$_warsawdir
44 make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
45
46 # Enable executable permission for binaries
47 chmod +x "$pkgdir/usr/bin/warsaw/core"
48 chmod +x "$pkgdir/usr/bin/warsaw/migratecache"
49 chmod +x "$pkgdir/usr/bin/warsaw/wsatspi"
50 chmod +x "$pkgdir/usr/bin/warsaw/wscertmgr"
51
52 # Set paths in comply with Arch Packaging Standards
53 # i.e. Use /usr/bin, /etc, and /tmp
54 sed -i 's|/usr/local/etc|/etc|g;s|/var/tmp|/tmp|' \
55 "$pkgdir/usr/bin/warsaw/wscertmgr"
56 sed -i 's|/usr/local/bin|/usr/bin|' \
57 "$pkgdir/etc/xdg/autostart/warsaw.desktop"
58
59 # Install copyright and license in proper directory
60 install -Dm644 "$pkgdir"/usr/share/{doc,licenses}/warsaw/copyright
61 rm -rf "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc"
62
63 # Fix insecure RPATH to /usr/local/ directories
64 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin/warsaw/migratecache"
65 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wsftuan.so"
66 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wslbmid.so"
67 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wsftup.so"
68 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wsftbmo.so"
69 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wsftbco.so"
70 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wsftbid.so"
71 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wsftdl.so"
72 chrpath -d "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/wsbrmu.so"
73
74 # Use systemd service instead of SysVinit script
75 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/warsaw.service" \
76 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/warsaw.service"
77 rm -rf "$pkgdir/etc/init.d"
78
79 # Use native libraries
80 rm "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2"
81 rm "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/libc.so.6"
82 rm "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/libpthread.so.0"
83 rm "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/libdl.so.2"
84 rm "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/librt.so.1"
85
86 ln -s /usr/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2"
87 ln -s /usr/lib/libc.so.6 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/libc.so.6"
88 ln -s /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/libpthread.so.0"
89 ln -s /usr/lib/libdl.so.2 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/libdl.so.2"
90 ln -s /usr/lib/librt.so.1 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/warsaw/librt.so.1"
91
92 # Fix .desktop file
93 sed -i 's/X-GNOME-AutoRestart=true/X-GNOME-AutoRestart=false/g' "$pkgdir/etc/xdg/autostart/warsaw.desktop"
94
95 # Symlink to /usr/local, as the binaries still expect them to be valid
96 install -dm755 "$pkgdir/usr/local/"{etc,bin,lib}
97 ln -s /etc/warsaw/ "$pkgdir/usr/local/etc/warsaw"
98 ln -s /usr/bin/warsaw/ "$pkgdir/usr/local/bin/warsaw"
99 ln -s /usr/lib/warsaw/ "$pkgdir/usr/local/lib/warsaw"
100}
101

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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