waveengine

maintainer orphaned · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from wave.blob.core.windows.net (Azure Blob Storage under Microsoft's CDN), which is actually a plausible official distribution channel for WaveEngine — the project's own domain is waveengine.net and Azure Blob Storage is commonly used by software vendors for distribution. However, this is still a prebuilt binary (not built from source) extracted directly into pkgdir via dpkg, with no verification beyond a single sha256sum. The host is not the project's primary domain, and there is no signature verification. The sha256sum does provide integrity protection against accidental corruption or CDN substitution, but not against a compromised upstream blob. The binary is executed at runtime (game engine with mono/openal/sdl dependencies). This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a plausible but non-primary vendor host, no GPG signature, runtime code execution. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://wave.blob.core.windows.net/waveinstallers/$_debfile")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from wave.blob.core.windows.net (Azure Blob Storage under Microsoft's CDN), which is actually a plausible official distribution channel for WaveEngine — the project's own domain is waveengine.net and Azure Blob Storage is commonly used by software vendors for distribution. However, this is still a prebuilt binary (not built from source) extracted directly into pkgdir via dpkg, with no verification beyond a single sha256sum. The host is not the project's primary domain, and there is no signature verification. The sha256sum does provide integrity protection against accidental corruption or CDN substitution, but not against a compromised upstream blob. The binary is executed at runtime (game engine with mono/openal/sdl dependencies). This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a plausible but non-primary vendor host, no GPG signature, runtime code execution. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Michael J. Pento <mjpento@verizon.net>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=waveengine
    
      4pkgver=2.5.0
    
      5pkgrel=0
    
      6pkgdesc="WaveEngine - Component based game engine"
    
      7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      8url="https://waveengine.net/"
    
      9license=('custom')
    
      10depends=(mono openal sox sdl sdl_mixer gtk-sharp-2)
    
      11makedepends=(dpkg)
    
      12_debfile="WaveEngineSetup_${pkgver//\./_}.deb"
    
      13source=("https://wave.blob.core.windows.net/waveinstallers/$_debfile")
    
      14sha256sums=('b105ff703805ac2b92d5b9dff87e415f123940fb39bb6b1c8a14cc440f2dafeb')
    
      15
    
      16package() {
    
      17  dpkg --extract $_debfile $pkgdir
    
      18}
    
      19
    
      20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2