wazuh-manager

maintainer madara125 · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary from packages.wazuh.com, which is the official Wazuh package repository (the same host used by their official apt/yum repos). The sha512sum is present and pins the specific binary, providing integrity verification even without PGP. The RPM is extracted and its contents (etc/, usr/, var/) are installed directly — this is an executed/installed binary payload. The host is legitimate (official Wazuh infrastructure, not a personal or unofficial mirror), but the pattern of installing a prebuilt binary RPM without PGP signature verification is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the upstream binary were compromised or the checksum updated to a malicious build, there is no secondary verification layer. This is a real medium-severity concern (unverified binary from a plausible-but-not-cryptographically-verified source), not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:25 "https://packages.wazuh.com/4.x/yum/${pkgname}-${_prodver}.x86_64.rpm"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary from packages.wazuh.com, which is the official Wazuh package repository (the same host used by their official apt/yum repos). The sha512sum is present and pins the specific binary, providing integrity verification even without PGP. The RPM is extracted and its contents (etc/, usr/, var/) are installed directly — this is an executed/installed binary payload. The host is legitimate (official Wazuh infrastructure, not a personal or unofficial mirror), but the pattern of installing a prebuilt binary RPM without PGP signature verification is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the upstream binary were compromised or the checksum updated to a malicious build, there is no secondary verification layer. This is a real medium-severity concern (unverified binary from a plausible-but-not-cryptographically-verified source), not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Jesus Martin Ortega Martinez (madara125) <martin.ortega.arashi@gmail.com><jortega@condorbs.net>
2# Contributor: Kevin Muñoz (MrHacker) <kmunoz@condorbs.net><david.munozm@proton.me>
3pkgname=wazuh-manager
4pkgver=4.14.3
5pkgrel=1
6_remRevision=1
7_prodver=${pkgver}-${_remRevision}
8pkgdesc="Wazuh Manager for Arch Linux"
9arch=('x86_64')
10url="https://wazuh.com/"
11license=('gpl2')
12groups=("wazuh-siem")
13depends=(
14 'wazuh-filebeat'
15 'curl'
16)
17
18optdepends=(
19)
20
21validpgpkeys=(
22)
23
24source=(
25 "https://packages.wazuh.com/4.x/yum/${pkgname}-${_prodver}.x86_64.rpm"
26)
27
28sha512sums=('987acc2e344586dba932a23f09d6ba2c98a5a860925436a65da9fdf1032e4f70c71b1b2fd499e3939c2f2ae9557e8e411ad94b7549a721cdf4e6d34f7efb80fd')
29
30install=$pkgname.install
31
32package() {
33 #Setup
34 cd $pkgdir
35 mv $srcdir/etc .
36 mv $srcdir/usr .
37 mv $srcdir/var .
38
39 #change permissions (owner will be set in post_install when user exists)
40 chmod -R +w "$pkgdir/var/ossec"
41
42 #Set systemd service file perms
43 chmod 644 $pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/wazuh-manager.service
44}
45

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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