wikijs-rs

MEDIUM

maintainer gierens 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD uses 'cargo install' to fetch and compile the 'wikijs' crate directly from crates.io at build/install time, without pinning a specific version hash or using a local source. The pkgver() function dynamically queries crates.io via 'cargo search' to determine the version, meaning the installed version is not reproducibly locked. While crates.io is a legitimate ecosystem registry, this pattern bypasses Arch's normal source integrity checks (no source array, no checksums, no sha256sums), meaning any update to the crate on crates.io — including a compromised one — would be silently installed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed compiled code from an external source with no integrity verification at packaging time. It is not clearly malicious, but it is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

Medium External install via pipx/uv/poetry/cargo/go/gem alt_pkg_manager_install

A non-pip/npm package manager (pipx, uv, poetry, cargo install, go install, gem, conda…) fetches and builds an external package at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums.

PKGBUILD:21 cargo install --root="$pkgdir" wikijs --features=cli

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 80%): The PKGBUILD uses 'cargo install' to fetch and compile the 'wikijs' crate directly from crates.io at build/install time, without pinning a specific version hash or using a local source. The pkgver() function dynamically queries crates.io via 'cargo search' to determine the version, meaning the installed version is not reproducibly locked. While crates.io is a legitimate ecosystem registry, this pattern bypasses Arch's normal source integrity checks (no source array, no checksums, no sha256sums), meaning any update to the crate on crates.io — including a compromised one — would be silently installed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed compiled code from an external source with no integrity verification at packaging time. It is not clearly malicious, but it is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Sandro-Alessio Gierens <sandro@gierens.de>
    
      2pkgname=wikijs-rs
    
      3pkgver=0.2.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5makedepends=('rust' 'cargo')
    
      6arch=('i686' 'x86_64' 'armv6h' 'armv7h')
    
      7pkgdesc="CLI client for Wiki.js written in Rust."
    
      8url="https://github.com/gierens/wikijs-rs"
    
      9license=('AGPL-3.0')
    
      10
    
      11build() {
    
      12    return 0
    
      13}
    
      14
    
      15pkgver() {
    
      16    cargo search wikijs | grep "^wikijs " | awk '{print $3}' | tr -d '"'
    
      17}
    
      18
    
      19package() {
    
      20    cd $srcdir
    
      21    cargo install --root="$pkgdir" wikijs --features=cli
    
      22    rm -f "$pkgdir"/.crates.toml
    
      23    rm -f "$pkgdir"/.crates2.json
    
      24    mkdir -p "$pkgdir"/usr
    
      25    mv "$pkgdir"/bin "$pkgdir"/usr/
    
      26}
    
      27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2