wikijs-rs

MEDIUM

maintainer gierens 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD uses 'cargo install' to fetch and compile the 'wikijs' crate directly from crates.io at build/install time, without pinning a specific version hash or using a local source. The pkgver() function dynamically queries crates.io via 'cargo search' to determine the version, meaning the installed version is not reproducibly locked. While crates.io is a legitimate ecosystem registry, this pattern bypasses Arch's normal source integrity checks (no source array, no checksums, no sha256sums), meaning any update to the crate on crates.io — including a compromised one — would be silently installed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed compiled code from an external source with no integrity verification at packaging time. It is not clearly malicious, but it is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

Medium External install via pipx/uv/poetry/cargo/go/gem alt_pkg_manager_install

A non-pip/npm package manager (pipx, uv, poetry, cargo install, go install, gem, conda…) fetches and builds an external package at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums.

PKGBUILD:21 cargo install --root="$pkgdir" wikijs --features=cli

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 80%): The PKGBUILD uses 'cargo install' to fetch and compile the 'wikijs' crate directly from crates.io at build/install time, without pinning a specific version hash or using a local source. The pkgver() function dynamically queries crates.io via 'cargo search' to determine the version, meaning the installed version is not reproducibly locked. While crates.io is a legitimate ecosystem registry, this pattern bypasses Arch's normal source integrity checks (no source array, no checksums, no sha256sums), meaning any update to the crate on crates.io — including a compromised one — would be silently installed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed compiled code from an external source with no integrity verification at packaging time. It is not clearly malicious, but it is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Sandro-Alessio Gierens <sandro@gierens.de>
    
      2pkgname=wikijs-rs
    
      3pkgver=0.2.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5makedepends=('rust' 'cargo')
    
      6arch=('i686' 'x86_64' 'armv6h' 'armv7h')
    
      7pkgdesc="CLI client for Wiki.js written in Rust."
    
      8url="https://github.com/gierens/wikijs-rs"
    
      9license=('AGPL-3.0')
    
      10
    
      11build() {
    
      12    return 0
    
      13}
    
      14
    
      15pkgver() {
    
      16    cargo search wikijs | grep "^wikijs " | awk '{print $3}' | tr -d '"'
    
      17}
    
      18
    
      19package() {
    
      20    cd $srcdir
    
      21    cargo install --root="$pkgdir" wikijs --features=cli
    
      22    rm -f "$pkgdir"/.crates.toml
    
      23    rm -f "$pkgdir"/.crates2.json
    
      24    mkdir -p "$pkgdir"/usr
    
      25    mv "$pkgdir"/bin "$pkgdir"/usr/
    
      26}
    
      27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2