windscribe-beta-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 3 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 .deb binary from 'deploy.totallyacdn.com', which is Windscribe's own CDN (totallyacdn.com is a known Windscribe-operated CDN domain used for their official desktop app distribution). However, the checksum is set to 'SKIP', meaning there is no integrity verification of the downloaded binary. This is a real supply-chain concern: even if the host is legitimate, skipping the checksum means a MITM attack, CDN compromise, or silent binary swap would go undetected. The package installs a full VPN client binary with a systemd service and polkit policy (privileged components), so the impact of a tampered binary would be significant. The host itself appears to be the official Windscribe CDN rather than a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) the risk. The combination of an executed binary with no integrity check warrants a medium rating.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 source=("https://deploy.totallyacdn.com/desktop-apps/2.5.18/windscribe_2.5.18_amd64.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 .deb binary from 'deploy.totallyacdn.com', which is Windscribe's own CDN (totallyacdn.com is a known Windscribe-operated CDN domain used for their official desktop app distribution). However, the checksum is set to 'SKIP', meaning there is no integrity verification of the downloaded binary. This is a real supply-chain concern: even if the host is legitimate, skipping the checksum means a MITM attack, CDN compromise, or silent binary swap would go undetected. The package installs a full VPN client binary with a systemd service and polkit policy (privileged components), so the impact of a tampered binary would be significant. The host itself appears to be the official Windscribe CDN rather than a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) the risk. The combination of an executed binary with no integrity check warrants a medium rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Nik Rozman <admin[at]piskot[dot]si>
2# Maintainer: Windscribe Limited <hello[at]windscribe[dot]com>
3# Contributor: Nik Rozman <admin[at]piskot[dot]si>
4# Contributor: Windscribe Limited <hello[at]windscribe[dot]com>
5
6pkgname=windscribe-beta-bin
7pkgver=2.5.18
8pkgrel=1
9pkgdesc="Windscribe Beta Client"
10arch=('x86_64')
11url="https://windscribe.com/download"
12license=('GPL2')
13depends=('nftables' 'c-ares' 'qt5-svg' 'freetype2' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'curl' 'systemd')
14conflicts=('windscribe-cli' 'windscribe-bin')
15provides=('windscribe')
16options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
17install=${pkgname}.install
18source=("https://deploy.totallyacdn.com/desktop-apps/2.5.18/windscribe_2.5.18_amd64.deb")
19sha512sums=('SKIP')
20
21package(){
22 # Extract package data
23 tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
24
25 # Correct permissions
26 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}"
27
28 # Point files to the correct location
29 sed -i 's_/usr/local/windscribe_/opt/windscribe_g' ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/windscribe.desktop
30 sed -i 's_/usr/local/windscribe_/opt/windscribe_g' ${pkgdir}/etc/systemd/system/windscribe-helper.service
31 sed -i 's_/usr/local/windscribe_/opt/windscribe_g' ${pkgdir}/usr/polkit-1/actions/com.windscribe.authhelper.policy
32
33 # Move files to correct location
34 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt/windscribe"
35 mv "${pkgdir}/usr/local/windscribe" "${pkgdir}/opt/"
36
37 # Install license
38 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/windscribe/open_source_licenses.txt" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
39}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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