withings-scale-pairing-wizard

MEDIUM
maintainer rgibert 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt x86/x86_64 ELF binaries directly from fw.withings.net over plain HTTP (no TLS), installs them as executable files under /opt, and verifies them only with MD5 (cryptographically broken, trivially collisable). fw.withings.net is plausibly Withings' own firmware/CDN host, but: (1) HTTP means no transport-layer integrity; (2) MD5 provides no meaningful collision resistance against a motivated attacker; (3) there is no GPG signature or SHA-256/512 checksum. The combination of an executed binary from a non-standard host over unencrypted HTTP with only MD5 verification is a genuine supply-chain concern — a MITM or a compromised CDN host could substitute a malicious binary that would be installed and run as the user. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source_i686=("${_pkgname}::http://fw.withings.net/pairingwizard_Linux_x86")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt x86/x86_64 ELF binaries directly from fw.withings.net over plain HTTP (no TLS), installs them as executable files under /opt, and verifies them only with MD5 (cryptographically broken, trivially collisable). fw.withings.net is plausibly Withings' own firmware/CDN host, but: (1) HTTP means no transport-layer integrity; (2) MD5 provides no meaningful collision resistance against a motivated attacker; (3) there is no GPG signature or SHA-256/512 checksum. The combination of an executed binary from a non-standard host over unencrypted HTTP with only MD5 verification is a genuine supply-chain concern — a MITM or a compromised CDN host could substitute a malicious binary that would be installed and run as the user. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Richard Gibert <richard@gibert.ca>
2_pkgname=withings-scale-pairing-wizard
3pkgname=$_pkgname
4pkgver=1.0
5pkgrel=0
6pkgdesc="Pairing wizard for Withings Scales"
7arch=('i686'
8 'x86_64')
9license=('custom')
10url="https://support.withings.com/hc/en-us/articles/115009772968-Installing-my-Wi-Fi-Body-Scale-WBS01-"
11provides=(${_pkgname})
12
13source_i686=("${_pkgname}::http://fw.withings.net/pairingwizard_Linux_x86")
14md5sums_i686=("21b9067a8a5317827e37b92bf971ee1f")
15
16source_x86_64=("${_pkgname}::http://fw.withings.net/pairingwizard_Linux_x86_64")
17md5sums_x86_64=("97064fc63f19f08711382e01fd76b94d")
18
19package() {
20 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}"
21 cp -rp "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}"
22 chmod 750 "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}"
23}
24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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