womic

maintainer RogueGirl · 5 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt AppImage binary from wolicheng.com, which is the official vendor website for WO Mic (the url field confirms this). The binary is executed directly by users via a symlink in /usr/bin. The concern is real but not malicious: (1) only an MD5 checksum is provided — MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides weak integrity assurance; (2) there is no GPG signature verification; (3) the source is a mutable URL with no versioned path, meaning the binary could be silently replaced upstream without a PKGBUILD update; (4) AppImages bundle their own runtime and libraries, expanding the attack surface. However, wolicheng.com is the legitimate official vendor domain for WO Mic software, not a random personal host, so this is a standard 'prebuilt binary from vendor' pattern rather than a clear supply-chain substitution attack. The risk is real (executed binary, weak checksum, mutable URL) but consistent with many AUR packages shipping vendor AppImages. Medium severity is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("micclient-x86_64.AppImage::https://wolicheng.com/womic/softwares/micclient-x86_64.AppImage")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt AppImage binary from wolicheng.com, which is the official vendor website for WO Mic (the url field confirms this). The binary is executed directly by users via a symlink in /usr/bin. The concern is real but not malicious: (1) only an MD5 checksum is provided — MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides weak integrity assurance; (2) there is no GPG signature verification; (3) the source is a mutable URL with no versioned path, meaning the binary could be silently replaced upstream without a PKGBUILD update; (4) AppImages bundle their own runtime and libraries, expanding the attack surface. However, wolicheng.com is the legitimate official vendor domain for WO Mic software, not a random personal host, so this is a standard 'prebuilt binary from vendor' pattern rather than a clear supply-chain substitution attack. The risk is real (executed binary, weak checksum, mutable URL) but consistent with many AUR packages shipping vendor AppImages. Medium severity is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: RogueGirl <3a33oxx40 at mozmail dot com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=womic
    
      4pkgver=1.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="WO Mic can turn your phone to be a microphone for your computer."
    
      7arch=(x86_64)
    
      8url="https://wolicheng.com/womic/wo_mic_linux.html"
    
      9license=(unknown)
    
      10source=("micclient-x86_64.AppImage::https://wolicheng.com/womic/softwares/micclient-x86_64.AppImage")
    
      11options=('!strip')
    
      12optdepends=('bluez: Bluetooth support')
    
      13install=$pkgname.install
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16  install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/micclient-x86_64.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/opt/womic/micclient-x86_64.AppImage"
    
      17  mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
    
      18  ln -s "/opt/womic/micclient-x86_64.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/womic"
    
      19}
    
      20
    
      21md5sums=('875c5b18af2ddc2cfff2adcf52f39f92')
    
      22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2